The Jihadist Marketplace: Understanding Competition between al Qaeda and ISIS by Voynov, Hristo
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
All Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone 
Projects Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects 
2-2019 
The Jihadist Marketplace: Understanding Competition between al 
Qaeda and ISIS 
Hristo Voynov 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/2996 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 





































A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of 





































































This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political 










Date  Peter Romaniuk 
Thesis Advisor 

































ISIS and al Qaeda are the world’s preeminent transnational jihadist organizations. Following a 
public schism, the two started competing, even though they previous cooperated to accomplish 
their shared goals. This split divided the movement, which was previously united under the 
leadership of al Qaeda. Now the two must compete with one another for the limited resources of 
the global jihadist movement as the loser of the competition risks losing their standing within the 
movement, which may lead to irrelevancy, or even organizational demise, for the loser. This 
competition requires study because it is necessary to explain why the two would choose to focus 
their efforts on one another as opposed to their shared enemy. In order to expand on this 
competition, their actions can be viewed through a marketplace metaphor, where each jihadist 
organization acts as a business firm would in trying to monopolize its market. One resource that 
requires extra attention is jihadist foreign fighters, as they are a vital feature within the jihadist 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the last few years ISIS, or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria brought the first ever 
challenge to the norms of the global jihadist movement. This is because its rise enabled it to 
challenge al Qaeda, the previously undisputed leader of the movement, and offer the movement's 
participants alternative leadership to follow. This sudden duality was a sharp change to what was 
previously al Qaeda’s monopoly on the jihadist movement. How was ISIS able to challenge al 
Qaeda’s leadership and what effects did this have on the global jihadist movement? 
This must analyzed through analyzing the movement’s internal dynamics, because their 
competition makes little sense when considering both have very similar goals. By actively 
competing with one another, the two groups are limiting their ability to meet these goals and their 
greater movement’s overall strength because they spend their resources on intra-movement 
conflict. This internal competition over leadership means the movement is not reaching its full 
potential, giving its enemies an advantage because a lack of unity means a division of strengths. Al 
Qaeda and ISIS’ competition thus makes little sense in terms of achieving the movement’s goals, 
but makes perfect sense when looking at what they are competing over and how that competition 
manifests itself. 
Looking at this competition through a marketplace metaphor can provide valuable insight 
as to why it occurs. To do this, the jihadist movement will be approached as a traditional economic 
marketplace. Different jihadists organizations present themselves as a product in the global jihadist 
marketplace, and the market’s consumers are individuals who chose to actively support a firm 
through acts such as giving resources or volunteering to fight. Through the collective actions of the 
marketplace consumers, the jihadist movement effectively chooses which organization best 
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represents its goals and interests, giving it resources and legitimacy it can use to continue 
improving its product. In the early days of modern jihadism, al Qaeda had a monopoly on the 
jihadist marketplace. This changed when ISIS rose in prominence and gave the movement an 
alternative to al Qaeda’s leadership. In a traditional marketplace, this can result in competition over 
products offered to consumers, where each firm tries to provide a superior product. But in the 
jihadist marketplace, this led to violence between the two competitors. 
One possible explanation of this intra-movement competition is that groups refuse to 
cooperate because they are fighting over the limited resources of their shared market. The global 
jihadist movement has a finite set of resources within it because of the limited number of 
sympathizers willing to invest their personal resources in the movement. Some resources are 
specific to a particular locality and its local competitors, and so are less applicable to the 
international movement’s dynamics, but others are international resources that likeminded jihadist 
groups must actively compete over, such as foreign fighters. This is because any movement 
specific resource one group holds is a resource other groups are deprived of, changing relative 
capabilities inside the movement. If one group holds a monopoly over the movement’s leadership, 
it has the power to hold and distribute such resources however it decides to. If a competing group 
tries to take a share of these resources, it creates competition and conflict between the two groups. 
This conflict can become an existential one for those involved because if one group wins a 
monopoly on the movement’s resources, such as resources and legitimacy, the other risks 
irrelevancy within the movement, among other possible consequences. 
During the era in which al Qaeda was the undisputed leader, it had the authority and 
legitimacy to dictate much of how the jihadist movement developed. Due to this, being part of al 
Qaeda’s network brought many benefits for groups under its leadership. A prime example of this is 
ISIS’ predecessor, which took on the name al Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 after it became al Qaeda’s first 
3  
international affiliate and was tasked with organizing the resistance against the US invasion of Iraq. 
These benefits led to ISIS’ later growth, which was locally explosive but internationally restrained 
as it was initially working under al Qaeda’s leadership and so could not fully assert its will on the 
jihadist movement. When ISIS tried to control the movement in Syria and Iraq, al Qaeda quickly 
tried to reign it in. To continue its growth and operate unrestrained, ISIS decided to break free of al 
Qaeda’s chains and tried to rewrite the rules of the movement. It decided it would no longer be 
constrained by the order set by the movement’s old guard. Instead, ISIS wanted to create the 
guidelines and lead the movement in what it thought was the right direction. To do that, it had to 
overcome al Qaeda through taking over its share of the movement and its resources.  
This process of change is still underway within the movement. Even when ISIS appears all 
but defeated in the conflicts of Syria and Iraq, its leadership still has credibility and resources that it 
can use to continue the competition. This paper will thus explore how the competition came about, 
what the dynamics of competition are, and how it plays out within the movement and between its 
two key actors. The problem with this study is that much of the movement’s history, resources, and 
internal interactions, among other factors, are largely secret. Because of the movement’s 
clandestine nature, any information revealed about a group can be used by its enemies to minimize 
their capabilities. This should be noted as any attempt to list all the movement’s nuances will 
inherently be incomplete. However, the movement has been studied enough at this point that a 
detailed picture can be drawn, even if it is not all encompassing.  
Particular attention will be given to the appeals of the movement that have enabled it to 
consistently play a role in global events for multiple decades. This attraction deserves particular 
attention because joining the movement is a high-risk activity, but it did not deter tens of thousands 
of individuals from doing so. The reasons why it has been able to successfully appeal to Muslims 
around the world remains disputed, with theories ranging from economic discontent, adventurism, 
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and clashing identities. The movement study approach that this paper takes sees effort spent by 
jihadists to promote and grow their movement as a key reason for its consistently successful 
appeals towards mobilization of the global Muslim population. This includes complex recruiting 
and messaging campaigns, retelling of history to promote a narrative of Muslim victimhood that, 
and the recontextualization of genuine grievances of Muslims. The reality is that each of these 
plays a role in the complex puzzle of foreign fighting and any attempt to find the answer can 
overshadow the many important nuances of the foreign fighter debate.  
In order to explain the jihadist movement, the first section of this paper will focus on its 
history to trace how ISIS was able to rise to preeminence within it. This will begin with various 
concepts that are vital to understand jihadism and its ideology, along with providing a framework 
for analyzing the movement as a global phenomenon with specific aims, as opposed to simplifying 
it as a violent branch of political Islam or an irrational terrorist movement. The contemporary 
jihadist movement started with the Soviet-Afghan war as the testing ground for the ideas of 
transnational jihadism in defense of Muslims at risk, regardless of nationality or locality. Then it 
spread throughout the Muslim world, reaching wherever the movement’s adherents were willing to 
travel. September 11th prompted the invasion of Afghanistan and then Iraq, which again united 
global jihadists because of the perceived righteousness of travelling to Iraq to defend a Muslim 
country from an invading Christian army. This was followed by a lull in global jihadism, which 
was reawaken by the Arab Spring that opened the door for conflict in many of the countries in the 
Middle East, including Syria and Iraq, and created the instability that gave jihadists space to grow. 
ISIS then used its resources and unique position to expand drastically, leading up to a climax where 
it declared itself a caliphate, or an Islamic State. But the caliphate could not last against the global 
military efforts against it and has since lost most of its land. Even if ISIS’ reign did not last, its rise 
and challenge to al Qaeda changed the jihadist movement’s dynamics in ways that deserve 
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attention. This section will then expand on foreign fighters and their role as the movement’s core 
constituents. As an international movement that claims to represent the global Muslim population, 
the foreign aspect of foreign fighters will be reconsidered. While foreign fighters are foreign to the 
countries they fight in, global jihadism divides the world along lines that are vastly different from 
nation-centric identities that are behind the ‘foreign’ fighter label. 
This will then be followed by retelling of the jihadist movement as a marketplace in which 
the jihadist groups, or in the marketplace analogy, jihadist firms compete with one another for 
limited space and resources within the movement. This will feature analysis of movement 
conditions, including resources that firms compete over and threats to firms in the movement. The 
marketplace metaphor is much more applicable now compared to before ISIS’ rise since ISIS’ 
challenge to al Qaeda’s monopoly opened the jihadist marketplace to allow for competing ideas, or 
products, to be sold to the movement’s followers, or the marketplace’s buyers.  
The last section will extend the marketplace analogy to analysis of interactions and 
comparisons between al Qaeda and ISIS, including how the two firms interact with one another and 
the greater movement. First will be the battle over legitimacy, as competing firms must be able to 
justify being competitive. This will look at the main ways that firms can build up their legitimacy 
within the movement; through having proven their commitment in the past, through being effective 
jihadist actors in their local conflict, and through advancing the international ambitions of the 
global jihadist movement. This will be followed by analysis of the messages that the two firms 
send within the movement regarding a multitude of issues in order to ideologically prove to the 
base that they are superior to their competition. This will also include analysis of the methods used 
to distribute these messages in order to expand on key differences in the two firms. Next will be 
analysis of the jihadist ‘affiliate group’ phenomenon, where a smaller group pledges allegiance to a 
larger and more respected group, which has taken a whole new meaning with the rise of intra-
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movement competition. Since the two key movement firms began competing, affiliates have 
become a way of extending a core group’s reach to a new terrain, giving better access to that 
locality’s resources and building up credibility through greater reach. Lastly, there will be a look at 
organizational differences that contribute to the competition. While this is the least direct form of 
competition, differences such as organizational structure or leadership can change how a group is 
able to interact with and perceived within the greater movement. 
In order to understand the success of a jihadist group, it is important to understand the 
complex global jihadist movement that has opened the doors for that group to attract so many 
outsiders to its ranks. This paper hopes to piece together the many different nuances that must be 
taken into consideration to properly understand the movement’s appeal and how it has been able to 
grow even in the face of a global military campaign against it. Because of this, the paper will 
dissect the movement to explain how the groups within it function and utilize its norms to their 
advantage. 
 
CHAPTER 2: From Afghanistan to the Caliphate; a Short History of the Jihadist Movement 
 
In order to understand the relationship between ISIS, al Qaeda, and their movement, it is 
necessary to understand the history of the contemporary movement to contextualize the 
developments that brought about the movement’s current dynamics. What started out as an attempt 
to defend Afghan Muslims from the Soviet army transformed into terrorist attacks on civilians far 
removed from any battlefield. Nearly thirty years have gone by since the end of the Soviet-Afghan 
war, which marked the start of the modern jihadist movement and foreign fighting phenomenon. 
Since then, jihadism has appeared in conflicts all over the world that have no similarities aside 
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from having Muslim actors motivated in part by their Islamic identity. This has allowed the 
movement to grow by physically spreading its ideas, which has in turn shaped the direction of the 
movement. This is because new conflicts and actors constantly arose, allowing space for 
continuous learning and evolution within the movement. 
In order to understand the roots of the movement, there are three concepts that first need to 
be clarified. First is the concept of jihad. Jihad is a difficult word to define because its meaning is 
tied to various principles within Islam whose definitions vary depending on the interpretation of 
Islam in question. It is directly translated into English as ‘struggle’, but a more refined definition in 
Arabic is the struggle to spread Islam, though there are vastly different definitions across 
ideological and historical contexts in regards to exactly what that struggle is and how it should be 
done (Knapp, 82). While there are many strains of jihadism, the branch connected with ISIS and al 
Qaeda is Salafi-jihadism, which will be shortened in this paper to ‘jihadism’ and ‘jihadist’ for the 
sake of simplicity, as it is the only form of jihadism that will be discussed. The main goal of Salafi-
jihadism is a return to Islam's early days when Islam was the center of Muslim societies.  
The many stages of the global jihadist movement saw various different norms, depending 
on the conditions at the time. One such norm is when violence is permissible. Islamic jurisprudence 
deals with the legality of war and when violence is allowed, but many different interpretations of 
these issues exist, which means that extremists are able to use whichever one best fits their aims. 
The two forms of jihad that are key to the jihadist movement are defensive jihad and offensive 
jihad. In the Soviet-Afghan war, jihadists called for a defensive jihad which includes acts such as 
“defending Muslims who are oppressed but unable to defend themselves; using force to prevent a 
humanitarian catastrophe, and allowing a Muslim ruler to use force against rebellion” (Shah, 346). 
The other form of jihad is the offensive jihad. Some Islamic Scholars believe offensive jihad is 
never permissible, yet it remains an important part of the current global jihadist movement’s 
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doctrine. According to Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, a leading jihadist figure from al Qaeda in Iraq, 
offensive jihad is “going after the apostate unbelievers by attacking [them] in their home territory, 
in order to make God’s word most high and until there is no persecution” in which persecution 
means idolatry (Bunzel, 10). The motivation behind this is to spread Islam through acquiring lands 
and forcing Islam onto the conquered, which was the norm in the period in time that jihadists strive 
to return to. The terrorist tactics that the movement uses tap into the notion of attacking non-
believers in their home society, but are nowhere near enough to meet their highly ambitious goal of 
violently spreading Islam. 
The next concept is the ummah. The ummah is also hard to define, as it is similar to but not 
directly synonymous with ‘people’, ‘nation’, ‘state’, or ‘community’. As a word that originated 
from Islamic tradition, there is no direct translation of the word from Arabic to any other language 
which captures its entire meaning. A simplified definition would be the global Muslim population, 
but this misses out on the word’s implications of a greater consciousness unified through Islam 
(Akram, 387). A ummah united through a caliphate was the norm in Muslim lands before the 
Westphalian nation state ‘divided’ the ummah. The unity of the ummah is thus used as an appeal to 
the old glory days of Islamic empires, and when Islam was the key societal force, before 
globalization and colonial empires changed the Islamic world. The idea of a united ummah is one 
of the greater goals of the jihadist movement and is a key factor in why the jihadist movement has 
been able to successful reach so many beyond nation-state borders. 
The last concept that needs to be expanded on is social movements. A social movement is 
“rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective 
interests through non-institutionalized means” (McAdams, 37). The jihadist movement’s goals and 
grievances have often been ignored because of the movement’s terrorist tactics, but this does not 
mean that it falls outside of the given definition. One key jihadists goal that has clearly shown itself 
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within the movement’s actions is to establish a caliphate, an extinct form of state organizing that 
treats the Quran as the definitive guide on how society should be structured. The caliphate, and 
jihadism, is inherently incompatible with nation-states or democracy because it sees them as being 
organized by man-made laws that should be removed and replaced with sharia, or laws based in 
Islam and the Quran. Because of this, jihadists are an inherently excluded group because their 
political goals are mutually exclusive with the status quo, while their movement is an attempt to 
‘mobilize sufficient political leverage to advance collective interests’ and their tactics, terrorism 
and violent overthrowing of governments, is a clear non-institutionalized means of doing so.  
Classifying global jihadism as a social movement is likely to be disputed by those who see 
it as a security issue. This is because the loudest form of jihadist activism is terrorism and violence, 
which when tied to the movement’s demands leaves little room for anything but the full 
capitulation of society or destruction of the movement. While this is a valid critic of the movement 
itself, it does not mean that global jihadism lacks a clear collective interest it wishes to bring about 
and a distinct toolkit of tactics it uses in an effort to manifest that change. Regardless of this 
criticism, global jihad functions in a very similar way to other social movements. For it to succeed, 
it needs to be able to ‘mobilize sufficient political leverage’ by growing itself through convincing 
others to join or invest into the movement and ‘advance collective interests’ through activism in 
order to meet its goals. If a movement fails to grow, its range of resources that it can turn into 
political leverage is relatively limited, leading to ineffectiveness or irrelevancy. If a movement fails 
to advance its interests, it risks losing its supporters who may grow disillusioned by the movement 
or its leadership.  
If a social movement uses terrorism as its main tactic, the dynamics of building that 
movement are different from that of building a movement that does not. This is because the 
movement does not just work to enact change ‘through non-institutionalized means’, it attacks the 
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institutions it disagrees with in an attempt to topple them. Extreme tactics create extreme dynamics 
and so both movement functions listed in the given definition, mobilizing constituents and 
advancing their interests, can be altered. For example, an extremist movement with limited 
resources only needs one dedicated individual willing to perform an act of terrorism that will 
function as activism as far as the movement is concerned. This violent and vocal form of activism 
will bring attention to the movement, possibly allowing it to grow because the act helps it reach a 
larger audience of potential supporters, but will also put the movement in the eyes of security 
services who exist to stop such attacks. Similarly, if a terrorist movement does not accomplish its 
goals, it can blame its failures on the enemy that it is trying to destroy, projecting any responsibility 
for its inability to meet its goals on the enemy. As this paper will expand later on, both of these 
extremist movement dynamics are found within the global jihadist movement, either as an attempt 
to build the movement through its materially limited but morally unrestricted means or to create a 
narrative for its inability to successfully leverage its capabilities into lasting societal change. 
 
Early Era Jihadism 
The roots of the modern jihadist movement start with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt 
during the 1920s, as a movement to return Islam to its previous position of social dominance after 
western influence changed power dynamics within the country (Gunaratna and Oreg, 1047). The 
Muslim Brotherhood and other ideologically related groups such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad 
were able to leave their mark on global Islamist political discourse, even if they were not able to 
accomplish their local goals of replacing the then Egyptian government with one ruled by sharia. 
This originally local movement evolved over time and soon developed from a social to a militant 
movement. 
The Soviet army's invasion of Afghanistan was the spark that allowed for jihad to transition 
11  
from a local Egyptian movement into one with international goals and tactics. As the conflict could 
be accurately described as a Muslim country being invaded by an atheist one, jihadists drew 
parallels to the Crusades and with clever rhetoric were able to repaint the narrative of a local 
Afghan power struggle to present it to the ummah as a holy war (Gunaratna and Oreg, 1047). This 
prompted various jihadist actors take action against the invasion, such as funneling money to those 
fighting against the Soviet army or facilitating the transportation of foreigners into the war effort 
against the Soviets. Throughout the conflict, thousands of Muslims from different countries 
travelled to Afghanistan to engage in foreign fighting. This era of Islamic foreign fighters was 
perceived very different compared to today. This is because back then jihadists were supported by 
the US as a proxy force to fight the Soviets as part of the Cold War. This meant that the US 
assisted the movement by providing material support and allowing them to organize within the US, 
including at least one interesting case of a bake sale organized by jihadists on US soil aimed at 
funding the Afghan jihad (Malet, 165). This war and its discourse created the ideological 
framework of a global movement for Muslims to come to the defense of the ummah who are in 
conflict regardless of geographical location. By the time that the war was over, one major group 
involved in the effort had developed experience, resources, and networks that it refocused for 
global jihad instead of demobilizing. This group, now known as al Qaeda, emerged as a key group 
in the jihadist movement because it proved itself during this era but it did not yet command the 
authority that it would later achieve.  
The Soviet-Afghan war is thus considered to be the beginning of modern jihadist movement 
and the start of jihadist foreign fighting, and its end led to the next distinguishable phase of the 
movement, in which the veterans that fought in Afghanistan, as well as those influenced by their 
ideology, sought different conflicts to fight in. This meant to movement spread to conflicts that 
were raging in the early 1990s, such as the ones in Bosnia, Chechnya, and Somalia. Much like the 
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Soviet-Afghan war, this period saw jihadists searching for local conflicts to recontextualize as part 
of a global struggle, "the common denominator being Muslims who fought non-Muslims" 
(Gunaratna and Oreg, 1048). 
The 1990s wars that the movement tried to enter, such as Bosnia and Chechnya, brought 
limited accomplishments to the movement, such as defending Muslims, but ultimately failed to live 
up the movement’s prior success in the Soviet-Afghan war. This represented a challenge for the 
movement because it now had no war it could champion and no way of signaling its commitment 
to the defense of the ummah. The movement was thus at a lull, but it did have a significant number 
of already committed followers willing to continue its activism until the next time when the ummah 
could be mass mobilized. This coincides with the evolution of the movement’s doctrine and 
dividing the movement’s enemies into two camps, the near enemy and the far enemy. The near 
enemy title was given to governments in traditionally Muslims lands that supported the nation state 
model and were seen as standing in the way of jihadist efforts to reestablishing a caliphate. The far 
enemy became Western governments, mainly the U.S., that supported the near enemy, ensuring 
that they are able to withstand jihadists attacks (Steinberg and Werenfels, 407). Osama Bin Laden, 
then the emir, or leader, of al Qaeda decided that it needed to attack the far enemy and weaken it to 
the point where it cannot help the near enemy in the future (Gunaratna and Oreg, 1050). To 
continue its activism within its new target framework, the movement set its eyes on performative 
terrorist attacks. Significant early attacks that show this change in target include the February 26, 
1993 attack on the World Trade Center in New York City and the August 7, 1998 bombings of the 
US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya. Regardless of some successful high-profile attacks, the 
jihadist movement still had trouble replicating its previous success.  
The decision to target the far enemy was intended to be a long-term strategy because of 
previous lessons learned. The Soviet-Afghan war provided a highly successful model for defensive 
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jihad. The Soviet Union was ultimately defeated in Afghanistan, and jihadists effort in that war 
wasted so much of the Soviet Union’s resources at a key point in the cold war that it is seen as a 
key reason the Soviet Union dissolved shortly after. This was key to the tactic that global jihad 
wanted to replicate with its decision to focus on western targets, as the motivation behind targeting 
the US was to force it into a costly war and destroy it economically instead of through military 
means. This culminated in the September 11th attack, which sparked the US invasion of 
Afghanistan and then Iraq, and in turn resulted in the next uptick of global jihadism and foreign 
fighting. 
 
The Jihad in Iraq 
The 2003 US invasion of Iraq toppled then Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, but his ousting 
created a power vacuum which put Iraq into a state of chaos. Since the previous state structures 
were entirely disrupted, new groups started competing for local resources such as wealth and 
control over the locals. This is where ISIS’ roots lay. It was previously based in Jordan and called 
the “Organization of Monotheism and Jihad” but when the US invasion started, it moved its 
operations to Iraq and joined the growing jihadist movement fighting the invasion. There, it was 
able to tap into the movement’s support for the Iraqi jihad, including the flow of foreigners who 
travelled to the country to fight against the invasion, giving it access to valuable networks and 
skills (Lister 2016C, 16). While some jihadists joined other conflicts during this period, the 
majority chose to fight in Iraq (International Crisis Group, 5). The movement’s focus on Iraq was 
due to of the perceived righteousness of defending a country in the heart of the Muslim world from 
Christian invaders, as opposed to alternative conflicts that jihadists could co-opt, such as the local 
power struggle in Somalia (Hegghammer 2006, 24).  
In 2004, the Organization of Monotheism and Jihad become al Qaeda’s first international 
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affiliate, which boosted its credibility and gave it access to al Qaeda’s resources. To mark this 
change, it rebranded itself “Al Qaeda in Iraq” (AQI). Al Qaeda, as the leading jihadist group at the 
time, was in a position to offer this and other resources to smaller groups that pledged bayah, or an 
oath of loyalty, to its leadership. While the name implies that al Qaeda central had control over 
AQI, this is misleading. Al Qaeda central had some degree of influence over AQI but because of 
the need for security measures and AQI’s belief in its own righteousness, it could not translate this 
influence into direct control. Though AQI pledged bayah to al Qaeda central, this decision was not 
done because it saw al Qaeda as the rightful leaders of the jihadist movement. Instead, AQI 
pledged bayah at a time of organizational weakness and the pledge resulted in a boost in 
capabilities because of al Qaeda central’s ability to assist its affiliates (Whiteside, 9). As this 
merger was due to practical reasons and not ideological, the issues that resulted in their schism 
years later were visible during this period.  
AQI spent years involved in the fight against the US army and the newly established 
government in Baghdad. As it knew it could not compete in a traditional conflict, it worked hard to 
provoke a sectarian conflict by attacking Iraqi Shia groups in order to increase tension between 
them and AQI’s local constituents, Iraqi Sunnis. In terms of their long-term goals, this was more 
successful than fighting directly against the US for multiple reasons. For one, the sectarian clashes 
fed the greater conflict, creating a security vacuum that allowed AQI to act more openly. It was 
also able to tactically use its resources for sensational attacks instead of engaging in costly direct 
confrontations with occupational forces (Whiteside, 6). Third, it was able to justify its existence 
and legitimacy to Iraqi Sunnis, as well as bringing them to its ranks, because it presented itself as a 
group willing to defend them, regardless of the fact that it was defending them from retaliatory 
violence that it had provoked. Creating tension between different Muslim sects eventually became 
one of its main tactics, which upset the al Qaeda leadership because of its brutality and because 
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Muslims were dying in conflict with one another, as opposed to uniting to fighting against the US 
army (Hamming 2017a, 12). AQI thus prioritized building up its own organizational capabilities 
over fighting the invasion. As the war continued, jihadist efforts to fight the invasion fizzled 
because they were not able to overcome the US army and its allies, both local and foreign, as well 
as the global counterterrorism efforts.  
This failure heralded another lull within the jihadist movement, much like the late 1990s, 
where there were no conflicts that attracted widespread attention from the jihadist movement which 
limited the movement in its ability to organize or call on the ummah to mass mobilize though an 
easily justifiable defensive jihad. This period had many parallels to the previous lull, where the lack 
of a physical territory for the jihadists to flock to translated in attacks from the groups who still 
committed to jihad and willing to perform jihadist activism even when it wasn’t a period of high 
movement activity. While there were still appeals for lone wolf attacks in the West, the jihadist 
movement was unable to manifest enough attacks to rival the violence of the previous period. For a 
moment, it appeared that the movement itself was on its last breaths, but this was not the case.  
The next opening for global jihad came during the Arab Spring, which started in Tunisia 
against its then president, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, because of corruption and human rights abuses, 
among other issues. The developments in Tunisia led to the assumption in the West that the Arab 
Spring was a wave of pro-democracy and human rights sentiment, but the reality was not so 
simple. It eventually became clear each country had its own unique conditions and grievances that 
influenced the local development of the region wide protests, making any effort to generalize the 
movement inherently flawed. Similarly, the Arab Spring wasn’t a unified movement. While there 
were many pro-democracy activists, Islamists also took part. Some were moderate, seeking to 
establish an Islamist government within the democratic nation state framework. Others were 
extremists who had long waited for such an opening.  
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When the Arab Spring happened, AQI had an opportunity to leverage the massive levels of 
local Sunni discontent that had been building up for years. Before the Iraqi invasion, Saddam 
Hussein had treated the Sunni minority in Iraq better than the Shia majority. When he was taken 
out of power in 2003 and democracy was introduced to Iraq, Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki was 
voted in by the Shia majority and the previous power dynamics were reversed, upsetting the Sunni 
population. They felt mistreated and forgotten by the new central government, leaving their 
grievances open to later exploitation.  
Meanwhile the Arab Spring took a different path in Syria. The Assad dynasty had been in 
power for decades. They are part of the Shia minority, which was able to benefit from President 
Bashar al Assad’s leadership, as opposed to the Sunni majority. When the Arab Spring protests hit 
the country, the initial protests were in support of reforms instead of Assad’s removal, though 
violence and conflict followed shortly after. The country quickly fell into conflict, and its scarcely 
populated Eastern region was an easy target for jihadists crossing the Syrian and Iraqi border.  
The recent history of Iraq and Syria’s Sunnis created widespread discontent and many 
localized grievances that made radical change a possibility, if not inevitable. Al Qaeda in Iraq was 
the armed group best situated to exploit these grievances because it spent years learning military 
skills, building up its resources, and forming networks within the local population. The region wide 
movement gave it an opening in the form of wide spread conflict and a resulting power vacuum, 
and so it was able to swiftly take over territory in both Iraq and Syria. Its massive network of 
previous foreign fighters gave it the ability to reach jihadist movements from around the world, 
which allowed it to facilitate a large-scale foreign fighter recruiting effort and spread its ideas 
throughout the jihadist movement’s consciousness (Lister 2016C, 16). In Iraq, a country that had 
suffered years of violence and civil war, many armed actors came and went. This eliminated from 
the playing field various ineffective or poorly run armed groups and gave valuable learning 
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experience to the groups that survived. This left ISIS as one of the few capable actors within its 
relevant territory, which meant that it had little competition over the control of the local population 
and resources. Meanwhile in Syria, the Arab Spring led to the sudden outbreak of conflict, offering 
the opportunity for many different armed groups with different ideologies and goals to compete for 
power. ISIS’s history of fighting in Iraq gave it the experience it needed to sweep into the country 
and take over large swaths of territory with little effort. 
The Arab Spring provided an opening for jihadists in other countries that did not 
materialize the same was as it did in Syria and Iraq. Libya is one such country, which saw its then 
leader, Muammar Gaddafi, killed within a year of the start of the movement largely because of 
NATO efforts to stop his violent response to the protests. This created a power vacuum much like 
post-Saddam Iraq, but the key combatants were Gaddafi loyalists and anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries. 
Jihadists were also present, but with limited capabilities, and so they couldn’t find enough space to 
breathe in the conflict that saw many different nationally minded groups with foreign backers. 
More successful jihadist factions arose later in the conflict and were connected to al Qaeda or ISIS, 
but their success was limited and did not draw the same fervor from the greater jihadist movement 
that Syria did. 
Another country of interest to the movement was Tunisia, the birthplace of the Arab spring. 
Its month-long revolution saw the ousting of a corrupt regime quickly enough that global jihadism 
didn’t have time to coopt the conflict. This led to the introduction of democracy to the country, 
which saw Islamists soundly defeated in the polls. There were various major terrorist attacks in the 
years following the revolution, but much like Libya they were connected to outside groups and 
ultimately, an effective grassroots jihadist movement failed to appear in the country. While this 
appeared to be a positive development for the country, it also saw one of the highest global rates of 
foreign fighters leaving for Syria later on (Neumann, 2015).   
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In Libya, Tunisia, and the many other countries the Arab Spring progressed, the jihadist 
movement was slow in capitalizing on the unrest throughout the region. This changed with the 
success of AQI’s efforts in Syria and Iraq. Syria started to attract many jihadist foreign fighters 
while Iraq’s active jihadists were unemployed former soldiers or locals radicalized over the 
previous decade’s violence (International Crisis Group, 16). With how many foreigners travelled to 
fight to Syria just shortly after the war started, it was clear that it would be the movement’s next 
major battlefield.  
 
The Caliphate Returns 
The conflicts in Syria and Iraq saw AQI grow drastically over a short period of time. This 
presented it with the opportunity to advance to the next step of its organizational blueprints. On 
June 29th, 2014 in the historical al Nuri mosque in Mosul, Iraq, ISIS’ leader Abu Bakr al Baghdadi 
proclaimed that AQI had become a caliphate and took on the name the Islamic State, installing a 
caliphate for the first time in a century. A caliphate is the ancient state structure used by Islamic 
governments that use Quranic Sharia law instead of what Islamists see as corrupt man-made laws. 
It was used as a form of political organizing from the beginning of Islam with the Rashidun 
Caliphate in the 7th century up until the 20th century when the Ottoman Caliphate collapsed and the 
nation state took over as the main form of political organization. ISIS, al Qaeda, and their 
ideological allies see the demise of the caliphate and the fracturing of the ummah into nation states 
as the beginning of an era of humiliation. They view nation states as being weaponized state 
governing structures used against the ummah to divide Muslims to make them easier to subdue, 
and force them to live under western laws and norms (Rabasa et al., 13).  
The declaration of a caliphate had two major ramifications within the jihadist movement. 
The first is that it unofficially marks the split between the Islamic State and al Qaeda. The 
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declaration stated that the new Islamic State would include the jihadist group Jabhat al Nusra, 
which started when AQI sent in cadres to Syria to capitalize on its emerging conflict. Between their 
entry into the country and the caliphate declaration, Jabhat al Nusra established itself as the al 
Qaeda affiliate in Syria and fought alongside the more nationalist rebels against the Assad regime. 
Following the declaration, a power struggle emerged as Jabhat al Nusra did not want to return 
under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s command, resulting in a hard split with the newly established 
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria on one side and Jabhat al Nusra and al Qaeda central on the other. 
Later on in the conflict, the Jabhat al Nusra rebranded itself into a coalition with other jihadist 
groups called Jabhat Fateh al Sham and then later Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham to remove the stigma it 
received from being associated with al Qaeda and being listed as a terrorist group (Lister 2016A, 
63). The key period of time and organizational traits of this group that this paper analyses is during 
its Jabhat al Nusra period, and so for simplicity, the name ‘al Nusra’ will be used. 
The second major ramification was the assertion by al Bagdadi that a key goal in the 
jihadist movement had been reached. Throughout the movement, goals shifted between targeting 
both the far and near enemy, with variation depending on a particular group’s doctrine and its local 
setting. The most ambitious of the jihadist goals is the establishment of a caliphate, which still 
proved to be very controversial when ISIS did it. Even though al Qaeda also sees this as one of its 
goals, it believes that it should be done only after the far enemy is degraded to the point of being 
unable to interfere with developments in Muslim lands (Fromson and Simson, 32). One major 
theological implication of a caliphate is that it comes with a claim to represent the entirety of the 
Muslim ummah (Hamming 2017b, 71). This means little for the many members of the ummah who 
do not consider the ummah as a part of their identity. Outside of the jihadist movement, many of 
the so-called ummah already live within Islamic republics or nation states with strong Islamic 
principles, so the declaration of a caliphate geographically far removed from them had no impact 
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on their daily lives. Many Muslims in the West are fully integrated into their home countries and 
saw no value in such a declaration. Many Muslims did not feel any sort of sympathies to ISIS 
regardless of other factors, and instead saw them as following a perverted version of Islam that they 
had no interest in. Even many active participants in the global jihadist movement disagreed with 
ISIS in fundamental ways and refused to answer its calls for support. 
Others took this more seriously. Jihadists from all over the world started immigrating to the 
newly formed caliphate to fight in its ranks and engage in state building. In the beginning of the 
Syrian conflict, ISIS was competing with other groups in Syria over these foreign volunteers. ISIS 
worked hard to win this competition aimed at convincing foreigners to travel to its lands through a 
coordinated media campaign that eclipsed competing campaigns, both in terms of quality and 
quantity (Department of Homeland Security, 2017). This success within the movement also drew in 
massive counterterrorism efforts by nations that were determined to defeat global jihadist terrorism. 
Its success was short lived, as its rapid growth and ultra-violence resulted in a global coalition 
against it, losing nearly all of its territory in a matter of years. Nevertheless, during this time it 
manage to provide the only challenge to al Qaeda’s leadership of the jihadist movement and give 




In an effort to condense the history of global jihad into distinct periods, observers have 
started using the ‘waves’ metaphor, which helps draw distinctions about movement dynamics and 
thought at a particular period in its history. For some, the first wave started when the Afghan 
veterans travelled to fight in other wars, followed by a second wave in the late 1990s that focused 
on terrorist attacks on western targets, a third wave which was focused on the fight against the US 
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invasion of Iraq, and a fourth wave which mostly played out in the Syrian civil war (International 
Crisis Group, 2016; Bildt, 2016). This is listed below as Wave Model A. It is unclear why the 
Soviet-Afghan war is left out of this wave model, but this is not uniform across all interpretations 
of the wave model. Wave Model B sees the Soviet-Afghan war as the first wave, followed by a 
second wave during the 1990s that combines the previous model’s first and second wave, seeing 
the foreign fighters in the earlier half of the decade with the latter half’s attacks on western targets 
as one period of the movement. It then conforms to the previous model’s second and third waves in 
Iraq and then Syria, respectively (Coolsaet, 2016). The last model looks at the Soviet-Afghan war 
and the conflicts of the early 1990s as one, possibly because of the similarity in foreign fighting 
between those two otherwise divided waves. This models then combines the terrorist attacks 
against the West and the resulting Iraq invasion and jihadist activism against it as a second wave, 
possibly because the tactic and its result were tied together. This model then sees ISIS as a third 
wave because of the changes in the movement’s tactics and dynamics, such as the brutality and 







Table 1: Various Jihadist Wave Models 
While the waves metaphor provides a great way of describing the movement, it does so at 
the cost of simplifying the reality, which is that each wave is its own highly intricate phenomenon, 
affected by developments during the wave. For example, the waves that included large numbers of 
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foreign fighters also had multiple different mini-waves within them that divide when the foreigners 
enter the country, depending on the period of the conflict as well as conditions that affect the flow 
of fighters in both their country of origin and destination country. In the Bosnian conflict the first 
wave of foreigners were highly motivated but ill experienced. Many were individuals who had no 
military experience, but still felt the need to help the Bosnians Muslims defend themselves from 
the Serbian and Croatian forces. This represented the phase of the conflict in which global jihadist 
trends were closer to a defensive jihad, focused on assisting Muslims in conflict zones. This meant 
Muslims in the West could fight in Bosnia and return home without being automatically deemed 
terrorists in their home countries. Soon the Afghan veterans arrived, which marks the second 
micro-wave and featured more radical and experienced fighters who used tactics such as 
beheadings and spread radical ideology within Bosnia, causing problems between the foreign 
jihadists and the locals moderate Muslim Bosniaks (Zuijdewijn and Bakker, 4-5).  
 
Foreign Fighters and their Influence on Global Jihad 
One aspect of the history of the contemporary global jihadist movement that requires 
special attention is that of jihadist foreign fighters. They have consistently appeared in conflicts 
featuring Muslims fighting for their Islamic identity since the Soviet-Afghan conflict. While the 
current top down approach to studying foreign fighters looks at the groups they volunteer for, a 
long term study of foreign fighting across cases that are part of the global jihadist movement would 
allow for a bottom up approach which can provide insight as to how foreign fighters effect the 
movement. With this approach in mind, foreign fighter flows, recruitment messages, and other 
dynamics between foreign fighters and their destinations has the potential to give valuable insight 
into the internal dynamics of the jihadist movement. Similarly, comparing jihadist groups and their 
unique traits and positions within the movement can offer information as to why some of those 
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groups were able to attract massive numbers of foreigners compared to others who attracted few to 
none. 
To understand the phenomenon, it is important to find a working definition for foreign 
fighters, which is difficult because no definition is not entirely agreed upon by the scholars that 
study them, which gets further complicated when considering their contexts. David Malet, an 
expert in the field, defines foreign fighters as “noncitizens of conflict states who join insurgencies 
during civil conflicts” excluding combatants serving in a foreign army sent into the conflict and 
employees of private military/security firms (Malet 2013, 9). Thomas Hegghammer, another 
leading scholar in the field, builds on this definition with the requirements that a foreign fighter (1) 
operates within an insurgency, (2) is not a citizen of the conflict state and does not have kinship 
with the parties of the conflict, (3) is not affiliated with an official military organization, and (4) is 
unpaid (Hegghammer 2010, 57-58). There has been some disagreement over this definition as 
many foreign fighters have been paid while fighting, joined pro-regime forces, or are members of a 
diaspora who returned to their country of origin to fight but otherwise fit within the requirements 
for the ‘foreign fighter’ label. Mendelsohn simplifies the definition into one who leaves his or her 
home country to participate within a foreign conflict (Mendelsohn, 189).  
Mendelsohn also makes a critical point that academics and locals in a conflict zone can 
have different ideas of who is a foreign fighter and who is not (Mendelsohn, 193). For example, 
Iraqi citizens might consider an Arab from Syria that joined the insurgency against the US as less 
of a foreign fighter than US troops fighting in the same war because of ethnic and historical ties, 
though a legal or scholarly definition would say the opposite. Because jihadism is a transnational 
movement and it perceives the ummah as a united group, its ‘foreign fighters’ are in an unclear 
position. The movement and groups that these foreign fighters are entering have transnational goals 
and seemingly no geographical limit for their actions. With this in mind, what does foreign mean 
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for a group whose ideology sees the entire world as its sphere of operation and a global community 
as its constituency?  
It is also important to look at what role foreign fighters play within the jihadist movement. 
Foreign fighters help fuel the movement by volunteering militarily and transferring skills from one 
conflict to another, both of which are major boost in capabilities. Because of the clandestine nature 
of foreign fighting and groups that receive foreign fighters, there is no definitive data on how many 
have joined foreign jihadist groups, even with today’s highly reported on wave. But even early 
estimates regarding jihadist foreign fighters in Syria list the numbers in the triple digits, which tells 
a cautionary tale even if they are not perfectly accurate. The war started in early 2011, and one 
report published a year and a half later states 11,000 foreigners entered to fight for Syrian jihadists 
(Zelin, 2013). A different report states 12,000 for mid-2014 (Barrett, 6). The numbers continued to 
climb, with a reported 20,000 in January, 2015 and 30,000 in December of that same year 
(Neumann, 2015; Benmelech and Flor, 1). While it is impossible to pinpoint the exact number, 
what is clear is that this is a significant number of individuals that flowed into the country and 
jihadist ranks, perpetuating the conflict and giving jihadists an inflated level of representation and 
capabilities, as far as the local conflict marketplace is concerned.   
Another issue with foreign fighters is that they perpetuate the movement, ensuring that it 
will continue even in the face of significant human losses. While AQI lost fighters during the US 
invasion of Iraq, it also had an influx of foreigners coming to its ranks, which helped keep it active 
enough to survive until it had a better opportunity as ISIS. Many jihadist foreign fighters also 
become shunned from their home countries because their activities turn them into a terrorist risk if 
they return. They have few alternatives to turn to after they are done fighting, and one of the easiest 
options is to continue fighting in the jihadist movement, as they have already paid the high entry 
cost to join the movement, and leaving can prove to be even costlier. This is certainly not the end 
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result for all foreign fighters, as many will die, become disillusioned with the movement and leave, 
or a number of other possibilities. But considering that the number of jihadist foreigners to enter 
Syria during its conflict is in the tens of thousands, many will continue to fight within the 
movement. It must also be noted that many prominent figures within the movement, including big 
names such as now deceased ex-al Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden and current al Qaeda leader 
Ayman al Zawahiri, fall under most if not all given definitions of a foreign fighter. It is highly 
probable that some of today’s jihadist foot soldiers will stay within the movement. This means that 
after their current conflict is over, they are able to perform effective acts of activist terrorism to 
ensure the movement is active while waiting for any lull to end, or they can wait until the next 
conflict they can coopt. 
One other major effect that foreign jihadist have within the movement is the fact that many 
jihadist volunteers bring their knowledge when they travel to fight, which helps jihadist groups 
learn and grow from the past. This can include civil skills such as engineering or media production, 
but is often military skills. However, unlike traditional militaries or armed group that grow from 
their own experience, foreign fighters often bring military experience from other jihadist groups, or 
their past lives as soldiers in professional armies, which improves a group’s capabilities to learn 
through a widened pool of knowledge to draw from. 
Aside from their roles in the movement, one key reason to studying foreign fighters is that 
jihadist foreign fighters are a litmus test of what direction the movement is headed. This is because 
jihadist groups compete for foreign fighters in order to convince them that they should volunteer 
for their group as opposed to another. By volunteering for a group, an individual is buying into the 
group’s ideas and supporting it over other groups within the movement. With this in mind, jihadist 
foreign fighters should be studied in order to fully understand the jihadist movement itself because 
they are the grassroots constituents of the movement. 
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There are two main reasons to make this claim. First, foreigners are often the ideological 
hardliners of a group as they voluntarily choose to enter its ranks (Gates and Podder, 108). This is 
opposed to local fighters who often join armed groups because of their material conditions or 
localized grievances, and so are not as supportive of the ideological underpinnings of a group 
compared to foreigners. Foreign jihadists can choose which group they join, which makes their 
support something that jihadist groups must actively compete for. In this sense, their choice tells us 
important information about which group is ‘in’ according to the overall mood of the movement. If 
one group receives many foreign fighters while another receives none, this indicates that former 
group is much more in tune to the movement’s sentiment than the latter. 
Second, as a transnational movement with no clear boundaries, 'foreigners' are the largest 
possible recruiting pool for groups within movement. Were this not the case, each jihadist group’s 
recruiting pool would be largely limited to their immediate civilian population. Since the global 
jihadist movement is (as per its name) global, it needs globally minded individuals to perpetuate 
itself. A jihadist group with purely local goals is unlikely to attract transnationally minded jihadists, 
especially if those jihadists have transnationally oriented groups as alternative options to support. 
Actors within this movement have recognized this, as evident by the large-scale effort to bring in 
foreign fighters. 
This also leads to the conclusion that an increase in cases of jihadist foreign fighters over an 
extended period indicates an uptick in the vitality of the movement, while the same can be said in 
reverse about a decrease in such activity. This is because if there were no transnationally minded 
group that can capture the transnational movement’s attention, there would be fewer cases of such 
foreign fighters. This is recognized within the literature as the waves metaphor used to show the 
history of jihadist foreign fighting, as it captures the high levels of jihadist activity with lulls of 
comparatively little activity in between.  
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Implications for the Movement 
The jihadist movement initially sought to return Islam to its previous level of social 
dominance. Its early era saw globally minded jihadists fighting to defend Muslims from attacking 
‘crusaders’, such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. But through the years it evolved and 
became better known for its use of terrorism, such as the September 11th attacks or the ultraviolent 
videos of beheadings put out by certain jihadists groups. During this time, the movement evolved 
and transformed in unpredictable ways due to the changing nature of global events and internal 
dynamics within the movement. 
The traditional movement leaders, al Qaeda, made a name for themselves through 
organizing the war effort of the Afghan conflict and then spent years as the sole group capable of 
acting out the movements transnational goals. This de facto turned it into the leaders of the 
movement and led to other jihadist groups pledging their allegiance. This only changed because 
ISIS, previously its affiliate known as al Qaeda in Iraq, was able to expand in both strength and 
skill while organizing the efforts against the US invasion of Iraq. Eventually it became strong 
enough to openly challenge al Qaeda, which is the first time that the jihadist movement was split 
between two competing factions. This upset the natural order of the jihadist movement, as now al 
Qaeda and ISIS had to compete over legitimacy, resources, and followers of the movement. In 
order to explain how this competition played out, first it is important to look at the movement and 
the conditions within it that dictate the ways that jihadist groups function before looking at how 





CHAPTER 3: Marketplace Conditions 
 
As an ever-evolving eco-system, the global jihadist movement has specific characteristics 
that affect the different organizations within it. To remain competitive, each group must act in a 
way that takes into consideration the entire movement, from its local actions to how other like-
minded organizations behave. In that sense, the lens through which ISIS and other jihadist groups 
are analyzed can be shifted from a political to a market lens, in which each group acts as a business 
firm to maximize their profits. Under this metaphor, a jihadist firm works to sell itself as a product 
by engaging potential buyers, or potential supporters. Those who support the firm as a product can 
buy into the product or support it in multiple ways, such as answering its calls for attacks or 
providing donating to its coffers. A firm having buyers means that individuals within the jihadist 
movement believe that the firm’s product is worth buying over competing products. This can 
translate into profit for the firm in the way of resources, and could be used by the organization to 
further its goals. As an ideological movement, these goals are often political goals, but can include 
profit in the traditional business sense. Each jihadist group that competes within the marketplace 
must act as a business firm would in trying to dominate its relevant market. If it doesn’t, it risks 
missing out on profits or going out of business because of more effective competing jihadist firms 
who can win over its resources.  
 
The Market’s Resources 
For any political movement or business firm to grow, it requires resources. Such resources 
can vary, as each unique marketplace has its unique requirements for function and growth. Some 
resources, such as money, are highly flexible and can be used in most industries. But in 
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underground markets, such as the jihadist marketplace, even flexible resources such as money can 
have very different rules. In this example, it would be just as important to have access to skills such 
as money laundering to be able to safely use the money. Flexible resources within the jihadist 
market can thus greatly vary, ranging from micro level resources used by a particular group to 
macro level resources that can affect the entirety of the movement. They can also be tangible and 
straightforward, such as weapons used for combat, to intangible and trivial to outsiders, such as the 
need for uncensored access to the internet.  
The source of the resources is also highly important. Resources can come to a group from 
either the local or international marketplace. A particular resources can come from both, but the 
process of acquiring them can be vastly different. Local recruits, for example, can join a group 
within their locality with little to no difficulty. On the other hand are foreign recruits often take 
great risks on their journey to volunteer for a group. Certain means of attaining resources are in 
their own right an intangible resource for groups because of the difficulty in establishing them. 
This can come in the form of local routes used to smuggle goods or individuals without being 
caught, or in the form of international state sponsors that may support the firm out of a common 
enemy or support for their ideology.  
In looking at ISIS’ rise, Ligon et al. (2014) discuss the resources that ISIS used to facilitate 
its rapid growth. The first one they discuss is human resources, including both leadership and lower 
ranking members (Ligon et al., 18). These are of vital importance, as a firm needs capable leaders 
to steer it in the right direction and disciplined members who can act out the group’s plans 
effectively. Within the jihadist movement, foreign fighters often become leaders after they have 
proven themselves. In other cases, domestic jihadists have travelled to different theaters with years 
of experience they can transfer over. One example of this is the Chechnyan jihadist fighters, whose 
years of experience fighting the Russian state have given them “an international reputation as some 
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of the toughest fighters in the world” (Mironova and Sergatskova, 2017). ISIS’ ‘breaking the walls’ 
campaign was also a notable and effective way of gaining committed local recruits in their ranks 
through storming Iraqi prisons and freeing individuals who then joined the group (Wyer, 2012). A 
group must also be able to recognize and utilize the many skills of their rank and file members, as 
this is the best way to allow its members, and itself, to maximize potential. 
The next resource that Ligon et al. consider is the structure of an organization (Ligon et al., 
26). Because jihadist firms are in a constant state of threat from competitors and enemies, they 
must keep their communications and resources clandestine. If they do not, they risk being 
compromised. If al Qaeda central tried to tightly control or organize AQI’s resistance against the 
US invasion, it would have risked the US spying on its internal communications which could have 
negatively impacted the organization. Many firms, including al Qaeda, attempt to structure 
themselves in ways that reflect their goals and plans, but are forced to trade of organizational 
efficiency for security to prevent infiltration and ensure their long-term survival (See Gunaratna 
and Oreg, 2010). 
The last resource Ligon et al. discuss are physical and financial resources, which can 
include weapons, munitions, natural resources, and cash (Ligon et al., 18). These are the resources 
that a firm can use to build itself with, such as weapons to arm soldiers and money to pay and feed 
them, which is vital to keeping an armed group running. Much of these resources must remain 
private information within firms, as revealing them would leave them vulnerable. For this reason, 
firms must be able to find ways of securing these resources and ensuring that they are safe until 
they are to be used. If an enemy were to know about the resources that a group has, they could 
work to deny access or limit the effectiveness of these resources, as one dimension of the global 
counter terrorism movement works to both destroy firm’s resources as well as prevent terrorist 
financing. A state or rival firm with such knowledge could also use this knowledge of what to 
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expect on the battlefield to prepare to counter the firm’s capabilities.  
Then there are the movement-wide resources, which are needed to facilitate the entirety of 
the jihadist movement, and not just for a particular group. That said, a particular group with a well 
thought out strategy could take advantage of these resources more efficiently than its competitors 
for relative gains within the movement. Hegghammer (2016) looks at these as an attempt to 
consider how the future of the jihadism will develop based off certain resources and how efficiently 
the jihadist movement can utilize them. He sees the spread of jihadist ideology as a product of 
long-term movement building efforts which were facilitated by favorable conditions. This goes 
against one common idea that jihadists are motivated by push factors in their society, which are 
conditions (such as limited economic opportunities or islamophobia in European countries) that 
would effectively push individuals away from their home societies and into the hands of extremists 
such as ISIS.  
Specifically, Hegghammer believes the spread of jihadism can be linked to resources that 
jihadists use to engage in movement building, alongside “broader socio-political strains” that affect 
society and allow for effective resource utilization (Hegghammer 2016, 159).  He acknowledges 
the importance of “economically underperforming Muslim youth” as a resource in the form of a 
large pool of recruits which are susceptible to recruiting efforts because of their problems within 
their home countries, but he does not see their economic underperformance as the key reason for 
their turn to jihadism. Instead he believes other factors are vital for the mobilization of this 
demographic in the movements. After all, practically all populations include economically 
underperforming youths, yet few of them resort to terrorism. 
The next resource that Hegghammer brings up is persistent conflict within the Muslim 
world, which degrades states and facilitates the growth of jihadist firms. When there is no conflict, 
traditional state security services are able to focus their energy on any threat that arises. When there 
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is conflict, state security efforts are divided and less effort can be placed on emerging threats, 
allowing new firms to enter the conflict market. This enables the next two resources that he 
discusses, which are the uncensored access to the internet and the availability of jihadist ideological 
entrepreneurs. Access to the internet is important as it allows for unfettered activism by a group 
seeking to put out its messages. While this activism has many similar positive for non-violent 
movement mobilization, terrorist groups can use it in a similar way to spread their radical ideas to 
recruit new members. This allows the next resource to be even more potent, as unfettered access to 
the internet is very useful to the emergence of jihadist ideological norm entrepreneurs who are able 
to spread their ideas. While these entrepreneurs can be unaffiliated individuals, they can also be 
members or sympathizers of a particular group and work in its interests. 
If these jihadist norm entrepreneurs have restricted, limited, or no access to the internet, 
their ability to reach and influence the jihadist movement outside of their immediate vicinity is 
severely limited. Norm entrepreneurs outside of a conflict zone are at risk of being caught by state 
security services, depending on where they are and how active the local security forces are. Firms 
with access to all of these resources have the capability of weaponizing their entrepreneurs and 
ideology, which can result in the form of massive social media campaigns that spread a group’s 
ideology. The importance of all of these resources within the jihadist movement presents the notion 
that the spread of jihadist ideas is dependent not only how good they are, but on how easily they 
can be spread. 
Macro level changes are also an important feature that must be considered by jihadist firms. 
These changes are major shifts in the marketplace conditions that can change the rules of the 
marketplace. Actions taken during critical moments can help a group grow drastically, while 
inaction may mean that other firms can reap the missed rewards. For example, the US invasion of 
Iraq offered an opportunity for firms to organize the resistance against it. Al Qaeda’s central 
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command, the leading jihadist group during this time, didn’t take direct action of this opportunity. 
Instead, it worked with ISIS, then AQI, to lead this effort, which effectively laid the groundwork 
for AQI’s later growth. This is because AQI had the opportunity to take control of many local and 
global resources that were dedicated to the jihadist war effort as well as gaining expertise in 
relevant fields, including recruiting and smuggling foreign fighters, all while gaining legitimacy 
within the local population and the jihadist movement (Whiteside, 8). If a group does not adapt to 
macro level changes within the global movement, it risks relative losses to those groups that are 
flexible enough in their operations to do so.  
As resources can facilitate a firm’s growth, each of them can play a role in how successful a 
group is within the jihadist movement. To explain the power relations within the movement, it is 
important to look at how each group was able to leverage its diverse set of resources and conditions 
towards its goals. Some, such as ISIS, were better able to take advantage of their situation than 
others and this can be used to explain its rapid growth within the movement. This is because firms 
within the movement are not isolated armed groups, but firms competing with one another for the 
limited resources of the global jihadist movement. A group’s success must be measured by not only 
how well it positions itself within its local theater but also how well it is able to utilize and project 
its success outside of its local context to others within the greater jihadist movement. 
 
Threats to Firms in the Marketplace 
Ligon et al. also discuss the threats to firms within the global jihadist marketplace that can 
severely limit the success of any firm if its response to them is inefficient. They focus on threats 
that affect the market dynamics, focusing on internal threats within the marketplace that arise 
because of competition between jihadist firms, and not threats to the marketplace itself from actors 
seeking to fight jihadism.  
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The first threat discussed is the threat of entry, which can be described as the danger of 
other jihadist firms entering the market and increasing competition for the existing ones (Ligon et 
al., 13). This threat is high in the jihadist marketplace, as firms are easy to make. This is evident 
with Syria, where a sudden security vacuum caused by a sudden conflict prompted the entrance of 
many competing firms in a short period of time. Firms are also easy to make outside of such 
extreme conflict zones, as forming a firm is not difficult; as per ISIS’ own statement to 
sympathizers in Europe all that is needed for the simplest level firm is “a knife, a cell phone, and a 
victim” (Ligon et al., 14). What is difficult is the firm actually operating within the marketplace 
over an extended period, and so newly established firm will certainly have trouble competing with 
more established firms. The marketplace corrects this as over time ineffective firms may be 
swallowed or disassembled by enemies or more efficient rivals. It is important to note that when in 
local conflict markets, not all firms are like-minded. In the Syrian marketplace, not all of the new 
firms were jihad oriented, but both jihadist and non-jihadist groups were still competing for the 
same localized resources such as weaponry and recruits. This is because transnational firms within 
the same ideological market such as the global jihadist movement must compete against one 
another, but local firms of any kind compete with one another for local resources.  
The next threats that Ligon et al. bring up is the threat of rivalry, which is the ability of 
competing firms to offer consumers the same product, and the threat of substitution, which is the 
ability for other firms to offer similar but different products to the same consumers (Ligon et al., 
14). These two high-level threats for the global jihadist movement, where many different firms 
offer similar forms of jihadist products to support. For a group to overcome this threat, it must be 
able to present higher quality products to the movement’s buyers. As the following section will 
show, firms such as ISIS and al Qaeda work to build up their legitimacy within the movement as a 
means of making their product stand out against their competitors. Because of these threats, a firm 
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must also be in tune to what is happening to the rest of the movement so that its competitors do not 
overshadow it in the eyes of the buyers.  
This development is seen in the rise of Islamic governing structures that jihadist firms now 
have adopted as a governing norm. Earlier in the movement, groups were more focused the military 
aspects of their operations. Today, jihadist firms are working on developing structures to govern 
territory they hold according to their interpretation of sharia (Drevon, 55). This shift is because of 
the success that the tactic brought ISIS and the need for other firms to replicate the tactic in order to 
stay competitive. Groups that ignore such changes within the movement risk having their 
supporters defect to other firms who are able to better act out on their beliefs. One other micro level 
development that has consistently been a source of competition between jihadist groups is that of 
media production. Like Islamist governing structures, complex media campaigns are not directly 
used for violent competition with one another but instead over the support of civilians. The 
majority of jihadist firms have improved their media capabilities over the years and those that have 
not will have relative difficulty in connecting to the global pool of potential supporters (Baines and 
O’Shaughnessy, 172).  
The final two threats to the market are those of suppliers and buyers. The suppliers within 
the jihadist movement are the movement backers, such as weapons dealers or sympathetic nation 
states that can provide material support to a particular firm. Even though firms in the marketplace 
compete against each other, the suppliers are many and are removed from one another, leaving the 
threat of suppliers collectively draining the movement through withholding resources to a 
minimum. While a particular firm losing support from its backers might hurt its ability to compete, 
as long as the backer shifts its resources within the movement as opposed to pulling them out, the 
movement will continue, though relative capabilities will be shifted. 
Then is the threat of failing to attract buyers who have the option to choose one firm over 
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another, leaving a particular firm without the resources it needs to remain competitive (Ligon et al., 
16). Within the context of global jihadism, there are two groups of buyers that must be considered. 
The first is the local buyers within a firm's territory. The threat from locals is high, as an armed 
group requires support from the local population to be able to continue operating smoothly. If the 
locals do not support an organization, they may assist state security services or competing firms, 
raising the cost of operating in that theater for a firm. This is especially so since many competing 
armed groups are mutually exclusive because of their competition. If two firms wish to occupy the 
same territory, they are in a position of direct competition between themselves and this competition 
can only end when only one is left in that particular marketplace. If a marketplace has only one 
active firm, that firm can act with impunity against the locals who do not support the group yet 
have no alternative to turn to, compelling the local population into support out of fear. 
The other buyers are foreign fighters who chose to engage in jihad. These fighters present a 
low threat to a firm, as an organization that doesn’t receive foreign fighters can still engage in its 
goals. If a firm requires foreign fighters to continue functioning, its capabilities are questionable in 
the first place. Because of this, foreign buyers are not a threat to an already functioning firm but the 
benefits from winning this feature of the market are high because of the many utilities of foreign 
fighters.  
 
The Invisible Hand of the Jihadist Market 
As a far-reaching movement with its own actors, norms, and resources, global jihadism can 
be compared to a marketplace in which firms compete to gain the largest share of profits. Just like 
typical markets, jihadist firms are competing within the market because a larger share of the market 
means more resources, power, and legitimacy. While firms can vie for a greater share of the 
market, their efforts are only one part in the equation of how successful a firm is within the greater 
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movement. No matter how successful a group is within their immediate context, success within the 
movement comes through different rules, and understanding these rules is vital for competing with 
likeminded firms.  
The movement’s resources are one example of private information that lets outsiders look at 
the movement’s dynamics. Certain resources are locally oriented, such as heavy weaponry, and so 
they only affect competing groups within the same proximity, regardless of ideology. Other 
resources, such as access to the internet, do not directly relate to competition because two jihadist 
groups do not compete over the same internet supply. Such resources speak volumes about a 
group’s local capabilities, while providing scare insight into their competition within the jihadist 
movement. 
 However, like-minded firms must actively compete over transnational movement-specific 
resources. This is because movement-specific resources that one firm holds are denied to other 
firms. After all, a foreigner may only volunteer for one firm at a time, and a generous government 
or individual that supports the movement has limited resources to invest into the movement. This 
competition over resources means that if a firm does not compete to win a share of the 
transnational resources, it risks being overshadowed by other firms and being limited in any global 
aspirations. Then there are the threats dynamics within the market, which firms must consider in 
their attempts to grow. If firms do not take the dangers of the market seriously, the market’s 
invisible hand can turn a firm irrelevant at best or disbanded at worst. With both threats and 
resources, firms are required to think ahead to factor these many details into their grand strategy in 
order to negate threats while maximizing access to resources.  
Until recently, the jihadist market was monopolized by al Qaeda because its actions 
throughout the movement turned it into the strongest and loudest jihadist voice. ISIS’ emergence 
disrupted this status quo and led to a never before seen level of intra-movement competition. The 
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two firms are fighting over the limited resources of the movement, but their fight has centered 
around leadership and legitimacy, turning narrative control into a large part of their competition. 
Because of the absolutist nature of the two groups fighting over a single position of leadership, 
unless the two set aside their differences, only one firm can come out on top. The following section 
will explore how the two have competed thus far, both within the norms of their movement as well 
as on the front lines, where the two have faced off militarily in various capacities. 
 
CHAPTER 4: Competition within the Marketplace 
 
Because of their unique history and roles within the movement, al Qaeda and ISIS are the 
two firms in direct competition for the leadership position of the global jihadist movement. Both 
are the only two firms within the movement that have reached a high level of preeminence and 
because of this, they are now in what is the only recognizable case of ‘brand competition’ within 
the global jihadist movement. Al Qaeda’s leadership evolved over time to the point where it has is 
often called ‘al Qaeda central command’ because it stopped engaging in combat on its own in order 
to better coordinate its global efforts. ISIS started as a terrorist organization that evolved into a 
quasi-state and is currently in the devolving process because it has lost its territory and ability to 
govern. Thus, the two function differently in key respects, which directly affects how they interact 
within the movement.  
The introduction of this rivalry drastically altered the balance within the jihadist movement. 
Al Qaeda routinely preached against fitna, or internal discord within Islam (Novenario, 74). This 
call for unity is a strong theme from Osama Bin Laden’s doctrine of a united global jihad, since he 
saw fitna as a threat to the movement and actively worked to avoid it (Bacon and Arsenault, 5). 
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During its reign as the undisputed leader of the jihadist movement, al Qaeda calling others to 
follow its leadership as a means of avoiding fitna is an easy statement, as it is calling on jihadists to 
support it within the movement’s status quo. When ISIS initially started to move against al Qaeda’s 
interests, this doctrine held, as there were at least five known attempts known to reconcile the 
differences between the two. Each failed, ultimately because of ISIS’ belief that the caliphate 
should not negotiate with other Muslims who are in fact obligated to support the caliphate instead 
of questioning it (Hamming 2017a, 6). This created a new category within the jihadist target 
framework; along with the far/near enemy, there is now the internal enemy (Hamming 2017b, 77).  
To truly understand the competition within the jihadist movement, it is important to look at 
the how the firms within it interact with each other under marketplace rules. After all, a firm’s 
success within the marketplace is not only dependent on what capabilities they have, but also how 
they are able to leverage their capabilities to maximize their position. Firms that are unable to 
utilize their strengths to advance their organization risk being overshadowed by firms that offer 
similar products to potential buyers. This new competition means that firms must now engage with 
the movement in norms that are vastly different from the ones before fitna became a factor. One 
such way is firm legitimacy. Firms are able to build up their legitimacy within the movement and 
use it to their advantage in interactions other members of the movement. A firm can also send 
signals to the movement about its stance on a wide variety of issues. Firms can use these signals to 
compete, either by denouncing one another or by outbidding one another by presenting their claims 
to the movement and allowing it to decide which firm’s message is more convincing for the 
movement’s constituents. Another aspect of this competition is branching out to other theaters. If 
one firm allows the other to work unopposed in a particular location, it risks losing all of that area’s 
resources because it allowed a competitor to freely organize in that locality. It should be 
emphasized that clandestine groups try to keep certain information private in order to prevent 
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hostile groups from taking advantage of this information. For this reason, much of the competition 
between the two firms will be private for a long time, possibly even forever. However, because a 
jihadist group cannot privately communicate to an entire global decentralized movement, there is 
much open knowledge that gives outsiders a glimpse into the civil war dividing the jihadist 
community. 
 
Legitimacy as a Battleground 
One of the most important aspects of competition within the jihadist movement is 
legitimacy. Legitimacy in the context of a movement means credibility that a group or individual 
within that movement has because of their adherence to the movement’s norms and goals. Not 
every firm is able to prove its legitimacy, and firms that cannot are in a position of weakness 
relative to those that have proven their commitment. A jihadist firm without legitimacy will have 
trouble competing for movement resources with firms that have legitimacy. That does not 
necessarily mean they would receive zero percent of the movement’s resources, as resource 
acquisition is complex and legitimacy is only one factor. But a group with little to no credentials 
would have trouble competing over resources such as foreigners or state sponsorship with more 
successful jihadist organizations who have already proven themselves in the marketplace. As 
discussed in the previous section, entry into the market place is easy but standing out in a way that 
allows for a group to gain credibility is difficult. A jihadist group cannot just enter the marketplace 
and expect to gain the benefits that established firms receive. A firm that wishes to compete for 
transnational resources must be able to prove itself worth supporting to those who hold these 
resources and can choose where to invest them. 
When considering legitimacy within the movement, three different aspects must be 
considered. The first is historical legitimacy, as a firm’s legacy of how committed and successful it 
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was in the past can give it credibility today, as well as insight into how it can be expected to act in 
today’s time. While historical legitimacy is fickle as modern actions can erode a legacy, it can still 
be an important feature of a particular firm. The next is local legitimacy, which comes from how a 
firm acts in its immediate territory. It must be able to keep the locals happy, or obedient, while 
acting on its jihadist ideology. It must also be able to prove its ability to fight for the jihadist 
movement within a local setting. The last is legitimacy from actions done in accordance to the 
trends and norms of the global jihadist movement. This means its ability to engage the far enemy, 
but also its ability to read and act on what appears to be ‘in’ within the movement at any given 
time. A firm must be able to prove itself locally but also globally in relation to other competing 
likeminded firms. Just because a firm is successful locally does not mean it is or will be successful 
within its ideological movement, as success within a global movement is relative to likeminded 
firms. For this reason, a firm’s legitimacy is based on both its ability to succeed in its local theater 
as well as be able to stand out from competing international likeminded firms. 
Al Qaeda developed movement legitimacy because it had previously led the Soviet-Afghan 
war's foreign fighter efforts and executed the September 11th terrorist attacks. These two acts, 
mostly the latter, turned al Qaeda into the leading jihadist group. After that it was been able to 
conduct multiple other high profile terrorist attacks, but in the recent years, it has had trouble 
repeating its previous success. The firm still emphasizes its successful September 11th attack in its 
publications in order to continue drawing legitimacy from it, though this is unlikely to work as a 
strategy for the long term.  
In an effort that started many years ago, ISIS built up its legitimacy within the movement 
because of its role in organizing against the US invasion of Iraq. The invasion prompted a large 
amount of jihadist literature and discourse on the importance of jihad in Iraq, creating the 
theological justification for a jihad in Iraq a decade before the contemporary wave started 
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(Hegghammer 2006, 24). ISIS’ unique role during this conflict gave it credibility which turned it 
into a significant actor during the third wave of foreign fighting. Continually fighting for the 
jihadist cause, especially within what the movement saw as a highly important battleground helped 
it build up its legitimacy.  
The battle over legitimacy within the fourth wave of jihadism was much more competitive. 
When the conflict in Syria started, it did not have the same theological justification as was the case 
in Iraq because Syria was a new battleground. Once the Syrian conflict erupted, the justification 
followed shortly after. Early on in the conflict, Al Qaeda’s leader Ayman Zawahiri called for 
“every Muslims and every honorable and free person in Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon to go to 
aid his brothers in Syria” in an effort to entice foreign jihadists into the conflict (O’Bagy, 26). Early 
cues to encourage jihad focused on the Shia government’s brutal response to the Sunni civilians 
protesting the regime. The sudden emergence of conflict divided by sectarian grounds presented 
the perfect opportunity for jihadists to open up a new front. Because of this, multiple groups began 
competing for jihadist resources and legitimacy entered the new marketplace. 
The main group in competition with ISIS in the Syria theater is al Nusra, which is affiliated 
with al Qaeda. While it also shares ISIS’ long-term goal of creating a caliphate, its pragmatic 
approach sought to change Syria in a way more familiar to the nation-state framework, at least for 
the time being. It does have more global ambitions that follow al Qaeda central’s strategy, but its 
immediate strategy sharply differed from ISIS. Instead, it (and other al Qaeda affiliates) turned to 
what is described by Charles Lister as localism, which he describes as focusing on local issues and 
building local alliances as opposed to focusing on international actions as a “strategic mechanism 
for achieving durable roots within unstable societies” (Lister 2016A, 61). This strategy does focus 
on the local, but it does not entirely forget about the international. Instead, it sees the necessity of 
building up support within the local theater until the time is right to reemphasize the international. 
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Al Nusra is not the only al Qaeda affiliate that has gone in this direction. This appears to be a 
network-wide strategic shift that started in 2011 when many of the affiliates started to lay low in 
terms of international actions while working to strengthen local bonds and support in an effort to 
recuperate after years of counter terrorism efforts against them (Lister 2016C, 10). This strategy 
has helped al Nusra integrate itself within the more moderate Syrian opposition, even becoming 
accepted one of the most militarily capable members of the anti-government resistance (Lister 
2017b, 10). While this translated to local credibility, the caliphate is much more relevant to the 
global jihadist movement’s goals. While al Qaeda central’s defense to this is that ISIS’ declaration 
of the caliphate was poorly timed and should have been implemented further down the line, this 
was not readily accepted within the movement. Following the caliphate declaration, most of al 
Nusra’s foreign fighters defected to ISIS (Bacon and Arsenault, 9) (Lister 2016B, 13). This shows 
that many of the movement’s grassroots believers supported the direction of ISIS’ leadership over 
al Qaeda’s. 
Early on, ISIS was able to position itself above the competition because of the claim that it 
reestablished a caliphate, which gave it theological legitimacy within the movement. Because of 
the theological implications of a caliphate, ISIS was able to create the narrative that Muslims 
around the world were obligated to support it. Returning the caliphate has long been a goal of the 
jihadist movement, and so it is understandable that this act brought ISIS legitimacy within the 
movement, even if a significant number of jihadists were critical of it. Through this, it shifted its 
messages from the basic and common recruiting message of calling for supporters to join its ranks 
into a more complex message using the obligation of the ummah to unite under its rule. While not 
everybody within the jihadist movement agreed, for others it became an important theological 
justification for supporting ISIS. Theological justification has played an important role successful 
recruiting campaigns of the global jihadist foreign fighter movement (see Hegghammer, 2006). 
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There is no reason to assume that it was any different during this fourth wave. 
Local legitimacy also applies to the ability to conquer and control large tracts of territory. 
While many jihadist groups have been able to take over territory in their relevant conflicts, ISIS 
excelled in showing its ability to control its territory and govern when it took over territory in Syria 
and Iraq. Holding large amounts of territory allows for multiple benefits for a jihadist group, such 
as giving room to safely organize or the ability to extract resources for profits. It was able to take 
over large amounts of territory very quickly, which gives the impression of a competent group that 
can continue to replicate its battlefield success.  
During ISIS’ efforts to govern its territory, ISIS used brutal punishments to provide stability 
to an area where law and order was lacking. One of the reasons that many of the local Sunni 
populations became firm ISIS' supporters is because they were previously neglected by their 
national governments. ISIS' brutal security tactics are still better than pure anarchy or warlordism, 
and for many dissatisfied Sunnis, better than the previous era of Shia majority rule. Al Nusra has 
had relative success in this regard as well. In its cooperation with local groups, it has gained 
significant local legitimacy. This success has helped it last as a respected group within the Syrian 
opposition. However, this also limits its ability to claim success because its accomplishments are 
not entirely its own. An emphasis on the local level can come at the expense of a de-emphasis on 
the international level, as appears to be the case with al Qaeda’s current strategy. This is justified 
by al Qaeda’s localism as a tool for building up strength and support until a reemphasis on the 
international level, but it is up to those within the movement to decide whether they want to focus 
on local conflicts or try to turn the world into a battlefield. 
International legitimacy is given to groups that can perform high profile attacks, such as the 
September 11th attacks or the Bataclan attack in Paris. This is because such acts prove a group’s 
commitment to the cause and its capabilities to act on this commitment. Firms who are either 
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unwilling or unable to produce high profile attacks risk being overshadowed by those who can. In 
this sense, terrorist attacks are not only done to advance the war effort, but also to outbid other 
groups and stake one’s claim within the movement. Outbidding in this context is the act of 
demonstrating a group’s capabilities, commitment, and goals relative to other groups within the 
movement (Novenario, 958). Before, al Qaeda was able to leverage a high level of legitimacy for 
itself within the movement because it was the only firm able to successfully attack the West on its 
own turf. Now that ISIS has demonstrated it also holds this capability, and since both firms have 
spoken much on the importance of attacking the West, they have set a standard for themselves 
within their movement through their actions and messages; whoever can produce more attacks 
holds more legitimacy. This has created the need for both groups to close the 'say-do' gap between 
their words and their actions. This turns a jihadist firm attacking the West into outbidding its 
jihadist competitor (ICCT Decyphering the Siren, 27). 
In recent years, ISIS has started using terrorist attacks as a way of acquiring legitimacy with 
various high profile terrorist attacks of its own, both at home and abroad. This coincides with a 
declining number of attacks in the west committed by al Qaeda (Hamming 2017b, 72). Even so, al 
Qaeda continues to claim as much legitimacy as possible out of the September 11th terrorist attacks 
through constant textual and visual references to the attack in its contemporary magazines 
(Novenario, 969). This change in tactic could be connected to its organizational push towards 
localism, as emphasizing the local level comes at the cost of deemphasizing the international level. 
While localism has benefits in regards to how locals actors perceive their relevant jihadists, the 
global jihadist movement’s followers represent a different class of individuals with different 
motivations and interests. Through the fourth wave ISIS was the only jihadist group which was 
credibly able to have both an effective local strategy and the ability to hit the far enemy, this is yet 
another aspect of how it stood above its competition. 
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Internal politics and political infighting within the jihadist movement can also affect the 
legitimacy of groups involved. At the start of the Syrian conflict, al Nusra was the al Qaeda 
affiliated group within the conflict, which gave it the international legitimacy it needed to become 
one of the preeminent jihadist firms within Syria. When ISIS declared itself a caliphate and al 
Nusra as its subordinate, it prompted a dispute after which al Nusra chose to follow al Qaeda’s 
leadership over ISIS. This resulted in public statements between the leaders of the three 
organizations in which the leaders of al Nusra and al Qaeda were noticeably angry over ISIS’ 
claim, while ISIS presented itself as pure and righteous in their actions. This helped ISIS’ image 
relative to al Nusra and al Qaeda, as it successfully portrayed its leadership as calm and collected 
while showing al Qaeda’s opposition to the decision as egotistic opposition to any new leadership 
(Ligon et al., 20). This strategy also included promoting the idea of establishing a caliphate as the 
natural next move in the jihadist movement, while portraying its competitors as stuck in the past. 
Considering the previously mentioned defections of many of al Nusra’s foreign fighters, many 
within the movement accepted this narrative (Bacon and Arsenault, 9).  
 
Competing Messages and Messaging 
Even though ISIS and al Qaeda are in direct competition with one another, they are also 
distant from one another physically. ISIS competes with al Nusra for local jihadist resources such 
as recruits but the two did not share borders for most of the Syrian conflict and so this competition 
was limited. ISIS and al Qaeda have competing affiliates that fight against one another, but these 
are in conflicts far away from the core leaders of the two groups. Because of this, the most direct 
theater for competition between the two is in the form of messages sent out by the firms in order to 
win the battle for hearts and minds of jihadists around the world. ISIS and al Qaeda have worked 
hard to engage with the movement’s constituents and assert their narrative as the narrative within 
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the movement. The messages sent often promote the firm’s ideology or stance on issues, so they 
deal with not only the other firm but also issues such as the firm’s tactics regarding the enemy or 
stance on certain issues.  
Awareness of these messages first started due to publicly released communiques between 
the two when they were peacefully competing for leadership of the Syrian jihad. The first such 
major communication was al Qaeda’s ruling in May, 2013 that stated ISIS should stay out of Syria 
and allow al Nusra to continue its work as an independent firm; “Sheikh Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi 
was wrong when he announced the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant without asking permission 
or receiving advice from us and even without notifying us” (Atassi, 2013). When ISIS did not 
respect this verdict, the tone changed and al Qaeda’s leader complain about the "sedition that al-
Baghdadi and those with him seek to raise among the ranks of the mujahideen ... assigning 
themselves as guardians of the Muslims without consultation" (Lister, 2015). This message, aimed 
at third party members of the conflict, can be read as an appeal to the legitimacy of al Qaeda and 
the need to consult it before taking such a major decision. Later on, the tone was more aggressive; 
“ISIS was struck with madness in takfir [declaring other Muslims to be apostates] and exceeded the 
limits of extremism” (Atassi, 2013). ISIS has not shown much interest in debating the 
righteousness its actions. Instead, its response to these accusations is that al Qaeda is hurting the 
caliphate and the ummah, dividing the movement by not supporting it (Bacon and Arsenault, 9).  
Messages released were not limited to publicly released tapes. Since the two started openly 
competing in 2014, all magazines published by either have addressed the other, directly or 
indirectly, in an attempt to minimize the competitor or emphasize why one’s successes overcome 
the other (Hamming 2017b, 65). This has turned into a competition to outbid one another to prove 
to their readers that they are better than the other. Though both ISIS and al Qaeda use the strategy, 
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ISIS has focused on it as one of its primary media strategies (Hamming 2017b, 66). This shows its 
desire to dethrone al Qaeda from its leadership position through questioning its credentials.  
The narratives that the two present about one another have become a major battleground for 
this competition. One common al Qaeda claim is that ISIS is disloyal, having broken its pledge of 
bayah. It also argues that ISIS’ efforts to establish a caliphate were rushed, since America and its 
allies must first be degraded to the point of an inability to interfere in Muslim lands before a lasting 
caliphate can be established. It presents ISIS as methodologically unsound for a variety of reasons, 
such as portraying its extreme level of violence as a risk of alienating many away from the jihadist 
movement (Hamming 2017a, 12). It claims that the ISIS tactic of targeting Shia is unwarranted 
violence that spills Muslim blood. ISIS' retort to this is that Shia are not Muslims and therefore 
legitimate targets. This has even created a shift in the movement where al Qaeda can present itself 
as a moderate force. It also works in tandem with its shift to localism as it has started encouraging 
its affiliates to imbed with locals, avoid needlessly targeting Muslims, and to stop planning attacks 
on the West in order to prevent themselves from being at the receiving end of global 
counterterrorism efforts. This however creates the risk of al Qaeda becoming outdated, if the future 
trends within the jihadist movement continue to support the direction that ISIS was leading it in 
(Hamming 2017b, 66).  
Meanwhile, ISIS presents al Qaeda as having failed in their position as the movement’s 
leadership. ISIS sees the desire to wait for America’s degradation before advancing to the next 
stage of the jihadist movement as a sign of weakness. They also see the attempt to divide Syria and 
Iraq between ISIS and al Nusra as a betrayal of core jihadist beliefs, as the two countries were 
divided by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, a treaty between Western powers that they believe has 
no relevance to their movement (Bacon and Arsenault, 9). Furthermore, they have created the 
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narrative that as a caliphate, negotiating with any jihadist organization is below it, as a caliphate 
should have the ultimate authority within the ummah and jihadist movement (Hamming 2017b, 
71). 
The two also present competing messages regarding the enemy of the movement that reflect 
these differences. Al Qaeda presents the notion that its military efforts around the world will bleed 
the American empire dry by draining its resources and economy in an unwinnable war with the US, 
ultimately being weak enough that it would no longer be able to meddle in Muslim lands. ISIS 
presents a similar claim, but within its own tactical framework. It emphasizes the high costs of 
coalition airstrikes against the caliphate in the form of retaliatory terrorist attacks conducted by 
ISIS or its supporters, effectively taking the war in Syria to the enemy’s homeland (Novenario, 
959) (Lister 2016C, 22). Though both present similar messages, al Qaeda’s tactic is to play the long 
game, while ISIS’ presents the need for immediate defensive action. Messages appealing for 
support are also affected by the group’s ideological differences. Al Qaeda presents individuals who 
fail to mobilize as being selfish and ignoring the needs of the ummah, while ISIS presents such 
inactivity as disloyalty to the caliphate, and thus to Islam (Novenario, 961). Both messages are 
intended to compel action, but ISIS’ messages create a sense of urgency not found in al Qaeda’s 
messages. 
The messages that the two firms present to the movement are only half of the messaging 
competition. While a strong message is important for a compelling narrative, the method of 
distribution has a large impact on how successful the message actually is. This is because each 
method of delivery has nuances that affect who will see it and how easily it spreads. A successful 
messaging campaign will use different techniques side by side, allowing for flexibility depending 
on the target audience, which maximizes the messages reach.  
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One of the main messages that the two firms send to the movement are intended for 
recruitment. The techniques used are often chosen out of security concerns, as groups must find a 
way to recruit while avoiding detection. There are two opposite recruiting techniques (among 
many) that have been used in the global jihadist movement that help explain why ISIS’ methods 
have been very successful during the fourth wave of jihadist foreign fighters, especially relative to 
al Qaeda. It works through an individual infiltrating a network, such as a mosque’s congregation or 
a refugee camp, and spreading propaganda once the infiltration is completed and the messenger is a 
trusted member of the network (Daly and Gerwehr, 78). This recruiting method is risky because the 
infiltrator risks detection but having intimate knowledge and a proximity to the small population 
allows for specific messaging that may increase the chances of a message landing. This technique 
was often used by al Qaeda during its reigning era when digital recruiting was much more difficult 
because of technological limitations. Infiltrating digital communities today is also possible, though 
building up trust is harder when done over the internet instead of face-to-face. However, with the 
rise of the internet, this technique has lost some of its utility in relation to other techniques that 
utilize the gap bridging qualities of the internet.  
One opposite recruiting model is the net method, in which messages are spread as wide as 
possible in order to reach as many individuals as possible (Daly and Gerwehr, 77). It focuses not on 
direct recruitment but on casting a wide-ranging message in the hopes that a few individuals will be 
caught in the ‘net’. This method can be weaker since the messages are less precise to target as wide 
of a pool as possible, instead of a message that utilizes a specific grievance. This technique has its 
benefits, mainly the minimal risks when done in the digital sphere, and it has a much greater 
recruiting potential. It is also important to note that this method is vastly more complex than the 
term ‘net model’ implies. While the recruiting efforts target the global Muslim population as 
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whole, it involves many diverse methods and messages that are used in tandem. One example of 
this is the fact that ISIS has released modifications for popular videos games such as Grand Theft 
Auto in which an individual can play as an ISIS fighter in a way that portrays ISIS sympathetically 
(Ligon et al., 33). ISIS also produces nasheeds, or sharia-compliant music, that it spreads online for 
its followers to listen to. While these aren't strong standalone tools for recruitment, it can normalize 
the group and its ideas in mediums that resonate with foreigners in ways that direct propaganda 
cannot. This works side by side more blatant propaganda made by ISIS, which the US Department 
of Homeland Security described as being "the most innovative and prolific English language 
messaging capabilities of any designated foreign terrorist organization" (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2017).  
Al Qaeda has also tried some of these tactics, though its ability to spread them appears to be 
weaker. The same Department of Homeland Security report stated that al Qaeda "has struggled 
recently to compete with ISIS' daily release of new media products" (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2017). The exact reasons why this is the case is private knowledge held within the 
organization, but it is likely due to two factors that work hand in hand; social media is a relatively 
new concept that requires learning to use and a firm’s effective use of social media is based off 
their ability to effectively utilize their human resources. 
There were significant technological limitations for the net recruiting technique during al 
Qaeda’s time as the undisputed leaders of the jihadist movement. The most effective way of using a 
net model in the early days of jihad were limited to acts such as sending out video communiques to 
news organizations willing to air them. This was still a major technological development compared 
to the era before that, but the reach of these videos at the time was still highly limited. The social 
media networks that ISIS successfully used did not become widespread until around the end of the 
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Iraqi invasion period, so al Qaeda did not have the opportunity to utilize it for its recruiting efforts 
when it was the undisputed strongest voice within the movement. However, when the opportunity 
arose, ISIS was the first to successfully utilize social media’s full potential for sending out 
messages. There are multiple reasons why ISIS was able to surpass its competitors in this regard. 
For example, al Qaeda central is not directly responsible for producing media content. They 
have decentralized this process in two different ways. The first is through media specific affiliates, 
such as the “As Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media Publication” which is the publicly recognized 
al Qaeda central media affiliates (Kimmage, 2). It has been used by al Qaeda central to spread its 
statements by its leaders, as well as documentary and attack videos. A study of its releases in 2009 
by Daniel Kimmage finds that a bulk of its production in that year focused on Pakistan and 
Afghanistan, where al Qaeda central is based. He believes this is because of how interconnected al 
Qaeda has become with the local Taliban, and that their new messages are not effectively appealing 
to the more traditional Arab support base of al Qaeda. This limits its reaching ability because the 
messages being sent out are more local (Kimmage 5). Kimmage also finds that the connection 
between al Qaeda and as Sahab was slowly deteriorating between this time, since as Sahab has 
tried to create its own identity, limiting how much control al Qaeda has over its own media wing. 
Another way al Qaeda decentralized its media production is through its policy of having its 
affiliates produce their own media and it encourages them to emphasize media production because 
it has recognized the importance of information warfare. This shift has worked for some affiliates 
and not for others. Inspire, the most popular al Qaeda related magazine is published by its affiliate 
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, is an affiliate that 
has had trouble effectively using the media side-by-side its military operations, even though al 
Qaeda central pushed onto it the importance of using media for propaganda. This is believed to be 
53  
because it lacked members who knew how to effectively use social media or work with journalists 
properly (Torres-Soriano, 969). This presents the notion that a group’s ability to utilize social 
media effectively is based solely on its members in charge of media work and the firm's ability to 
effectively utilize their human resources. It also works with the theory that the success of a 
recruitment campaign is contingent on how effectively the group is able to get its messages across. 
An alternative theory as to why al Qaeda was slow to learn how to game social media in its 
propaganda is because of how successful its previous media techniques were. Its use of internet 
forums was revolutionary in the early stages of the internet, as it allowed them to reach a wide 
audience of sympathizers looking to learn about the organization. The importance of this as a 
method of spreading their messages then could be comparable to ISIS' current use of social media 
for the same purpose now. Having such a successful strategy can make a firm less interested in 
learning about new techniques and methods, as a firm has little incentive to change a successful 
strategy. 
Another possibility is that ISIS, as AQI, had the bulk of recent jihadist enter its ranks, 
which gave it the opportunity to take in their skills, including social media and video editing. This 
continued into the Syrian civil war when foreigners were being utilized in their videos for their 
linguistic skills, imagery (such as foreigners burning passports or performing executions), or in the 
media production realm. While it is impossible to prove who the ISIS media teams consists of, it is 
clear that their high quality media products required highly trained professionals. ISIS’ foreigners 
brought in many skills; it is likely that media production was one of them.  
Al Nusra’s media efforts were also successful, but were still relatively weak compared to 
ISIS. This could be because of the nature of how al Nusra was started. Early on in the Syrian civil 
war, ISIS sent a group of seven individuals to form al Nusra in the country with the intention of 
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maintaining some level of control (Lister 2016B, 5). While these seven individuals were a highly 
capable task force, a quality media campaign requires consistent safe space and technology that 
could not be easily acquired until after the original mission was successful and the group’s 
presence was guaranteed. As al Nusra was intended to be a front group, it is not unlikely to assume 
that ISIS would have planned on keeping the advanced parts of the media production for al Nusra 
in-house. While al Nusra later had many foreigners join its ranks that could have brought in social 
media skills, the nature of their early relationship meant that ISIS had a head start that helped it 
stay above al Nusra in terms of social media and media production.  
The last reason that ISIS was able to most successfully use social media as part of its war 
efforts is because it had the best access to one of the jihadist movement’s vital resources for 
growth; unfettered internet access. Poor use of social media can leave the militants with social 
media accounts “vulnerable to detection, surveillance, and arrest” (Kimmage, 15). If a group, or 
specifically the individuals within that group, don’t take effective precautions, a simple post on 
social media can be used to track its location. ISIS, with its large territory, had no reason to fear 
arrests and was able to hide its media activists within the larger civilian population, keeping it safe 
from possible efforts against it such as air strikes. While other groups were able to utilize social 
media effectively, ISIS was simply in the best position to both maximize media production and 
organize its activists to spread its ideas on social media.  
This advantage that ISIS had to spread its messages certainly played an important role in 
the success of its foreign recruitment campaign. During the Soviet-Afghan conflict, supporters 
around the West were able to attempt to fund, recruit, or fight with little concern for the legality of 
their actions (Malet, 165). This is because in this era, jihadists were supported by the U.S. as a 
proxy force to fight the Soviet Union. Later on when the jihadists started attacking the West, the 
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ease of recruitment diminished and there were concentrated efforts to prevent the spread of jihadist 
ideology. This led to smaller numbers of foreign fighters, as recruiting became much riskier, while 
the current wave in Syria, which utilized social media to diffuse the security threats related to 
recruiting, rivals the first in its scale. This again supports Hegghammer's idea that the success of a 
foreign recruitment campaign is connected with how difficult it is for the group recruiting to spread 
their messages.  
 
Competition through Affiliation 
The competition between the two brands also extends to affiliates, as each was able to win 
support from foreign-based jihadist organizations that decided that it was in their interests to 
operate under a higher level a leadership. Groups that chose to pledge bayah to either typically 
renamed themselves to fit the brand requirements of the brand it chose to support. Those that 
pledged loyalty to al Qaeda would rename themselves in a way that showed its connection to the 
group, such as Algeria's 'Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat' which became 'al Qaeda in the 
Islamic Maghreb'. Groups that pledged support to ISIS became a wilayat, or province, of the 
caliphate, as when the Chechnyan jihadist group Caucasus Emirate became ISIS’ ‘Wilayat Kavkaz’ 
(Lister 2016C, 7). The name implies a piece of territory held by the group but in reality many of the 
affiliates are of questionable strength. This is not to diminish their capabilities but to note that their 
titles can be misleading. Furthermore, not all affiliates follow these naming rules, such as al Nusra 
and al Shabaab for al Qaeda or Boko Haram for ISIS. The exact reasoning for this is unknown, but 
could have roots in a desire to have the subordinate group not receive the stigma that comes with 
being associated with al Qaeda or ISIS that could increase global counter terrorism measures 
against it. 
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The India theater is a prime example of direct competition between ISIS and al Qaeda 
through affiliates. In September 2014, al Qaeda central announced the creation of al Qaeda in the 
Indian Subcontinent (Karmon, 71). Then there is Ansar-ut Tawhid fi Bilad al-Hind, a group which 
was formed by pro-ISIS elements of the Indian salafi-jihadist movement in May of 2014 and 
pledged bayah to ISIS, also in September 2014. The fact that both brands announced an affiliate in 
the same country in the same month means that they are both aware of the need to compete and the 
dangers of missing out on the competition (Rajakumar, 11). Another theater in which competition 
through affiliates is occurring is in Yemen. On March 20th, 2015 ISIS’ Sana’a Province in Yemen 
claimed responsibility for the deadliest ever terrorist attack in the country’s history which targeted 
a Shia mosque (Karmon, 73). This is important as Yemen hosts al Qaeda’s most significant 
affiliate, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and ISIS’ efforts in the country must be considered 
within the regional dynamics. It is also important as the tactic of using mass violence against Shias 
to unify Sunnis is a tactic that ISIS used in its early days in Iraq. This could be an attempt to repeat 
its previously successful tactic in a different theater. Similarly, ISIS has set up the ‘Khorasan 
Province’ in Afghanistan and has come into direct competition with the Taliban, a long-term ally of 
al Qaeda. Each of these show efforts by one group to outbid the other through affiliates.  
Acquiring affiliates is a peculiar aspect of competition, which shows the transformation of 
the movement’s dynamics. It took al Qaeda years after the Septermber 11th terrorist attack to get its 
first two affiliates (AQI in 2004 and AQIM in 2006), while ISIS acquired its first nine affiliates 
within one year of each other (Lister 2016A, 56). One major difference is that when al Qaeda made 
the organizational decision to take on affiliates, the decision to accept bayah from a group was 
based on simpler considerations, as today either brand must also consider the utility of the affiliate 
in regards to brand competition. Once ISIS entered direct competition with al Qaeda, the 
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importance of an allied network of jihadists was more visible, as not competing in a marketplace 
that is challenged by a rival means a flat-out loss. In the earlier days of the movement, affiliates 
were taken on when the affiliate was weak and could benefit from the resources that it would gain 
from its ties to al Qaeda (Lister 2016C, 1). However with a rise in competition between the two 
brands, there may be less requirements for a firm to take on an affiliate because increased 
competition means that the brands gets relatively more out of an affiliation now compared to the 
previous period. 
 
Indirect Competition and Comparison 
This competition extends to the organizations themselves, as each firm has features that 
distinguish it from the other that extends the competition in indirect ways. This is the least direct 
form of competition, as these attributes tend to be the result of an organization’s history or pressing 
needs as opposed to a conscious decision made to assist in competition. However as market firms, 
each of these differences can impact how the market responds to the firms, as minor differences in 
organizational structure or management can become major once other factors, such as competition, 
are introduced. 
One such feature is the importance of a charismatic leader, which has been recognized by 
many movement outsiders (see Spitaletta, 2015). This was part of the appeal of al Qaeda under the 
leadership of Osama Bin Laden, and his death is considered a major blow to the leadership of al 
Qaeda central. For this reason, the two brands still argue over which one is more closely following 
Bin Laden’s vision (see Bacon and Arsenault, 2017). When looking at the leaders, it is important to 
note that most leaders of public organizations, jihadist or not, often have a carefully crafted 
personas to keep the leader’s public image in line with the organization’s branding. It should thus 
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be assumed that any jihadist group’s leadership statements and public appearance are limited and 
planned out ahead of time, both to fit the group’s brand and security needs, as leaders of terrorist 
organizations are prime targets (Gunaratna and Oreg, 1045). In this sense, little can truly be known 
about the leaders of such groups, but that does not stop research based off what information is 
public, such as analysis of released videos. 
ISIS’ leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, fulfills the demand for a charismatic and recognizable 
leader. His personal history gives him the legitimacy needed to appear as an effective and 
ideologically committed leader, as he was a religious scholar who took up arms to participate in the 
fight against the US invasion. His only known pre-ISIS photograph is a mugshot from Camp Bucca 
when under arrest by the US occupational forces, which adds to his credibility as an individual who 
is in the fight for the long haul as opposed to a new and unproven entrant into the marketplace. 
His direct competitor for the top personality within the movement is Ayman al Zawahiri, 
the leader of al Qaeda. While Zawahiri worked his way up the leadership and took over al Qaeda’s 
top position after Bin Laden’s death, he lacks the combat experience and charisma of his 
predecessor, and it is believed that there was internal dissent regarding him taking control over al 
Qaeda’s leadership. In a study on his speeches, it was determined that he “exhibited narcissistic, 
obsessive-compulsive, and paranoid personality traits but not to the degree that would meet the 
clinical criteria for a disorder” (Spitaletta, 57).  
Along with the firm’s leaders, the supporting military and governing caste can make a 
difference regarding how respected the organization is. Both al Qaeda and ISIS are well connected 
to the global jihadist movement and this has allowed them to fill their ranks with veterans who 
have proven their long-term commitment to the cause. However, ISIS was able to bolster its 
leadership with many Saddam Hussein era military and security officials. This is because the US 
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invasion saw the dismantling and jailing of the state security apparatus alongside jihadists in Camp 
Bucca, which featured many prisoners from al Qaeda in Iraq, including ISIS’ later leader Abu Bakr 
al Bagdadi. There the jihadists were able to spread their beliefs and make networks that ISIS later 
utilized. This also let them recruit many military trained men who were unemployed following the 
US decision to dismantle the entire army, bringing in many soldiers and their expertise into ISIS’ 
ranks. This diverse military caste gave ISIS a local and international level of legitimacy, as well as 
valuable human resources that can tapped into. Having local military leaders gives ISIS the ability 
to use their local knowledge to make better informed governing and military decisions. In Syria 
and Iraq, this specialized local knowledge is best exemplified by tribal dynamics that ISIS was able 
to manipulate while taking over new lands (Lister 2016C, 15). While al Qaeda has a jihadi-veteran 
military caste which has proven to be a capable fighting force, ISIS' mix of veteran jihadists and 
ex-generals offers more potential because it has more diverse backgrounds to draw upon.  
One other major feature that differentiates the two firms is the organizational structure. Al 
Qaeda has a structure that maintains a solid hierarchy even if it does not have any formal territory 
to organize itself on (Gunaratna and Oleg, 1044). At this point, it has become very experienced in 
adapting to the situation because of constant efforts against it. While losing leaders is not ideal for 
any organization, al Qaeda has evolved to be very resilient and replenish its losses. On the other 
hand is ISIS, which spent most of its history acting as a terrorist group, but later transformed itself 
into a state-like structure in order to better govern its territory. At its peak, ISIS organized its 
governing structure in a traditional state form, which gave individuals the opportunity to prove 
themselves and advance up the hierarchy after having gone through extensive training and proven 
themselves and their ability to act in accordance to ISIS’ goals (Ligon et al., 27). This creates an 
incentive for capable individuals who can move up the ranks to join ISIS, but more importantly it 
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gave ISIS the ability to control its territory in a highly centralized way, allowing for greater 
efficiency, along with the ability to grow new leaders and replenish those that fall in combat.  
It remains to be seen if it is able to reorganize itself to recuperate from its current losses. It 
can survive for a long time if it reverts to its old organizational strategies as a clandestine group, 
but it will certainly be faced with increased local military efforts to eradicate it. Its long-term 
survival thus depends on whether its leadership can adapt and survive, or transfer itself to another 
failed state where it can avoid direct confrontations while it regroups. What remains to be seen is if 
it will maintain the ability to compete within the jihadist movement, or if it will be forced to focus 
on ensuring organizational survival.  
A key difference that spawns from the organizational structure in response to security 
concerns is the ease of entrance into a firm’s ranks, which surely had an impact on the success of 
foreign recruitment campaigns. In this comparison, al Nusra presents a firm with tight restrictions 
on its membership. It has strict requirements for potential recruits, including demanding 
recommendations from trusted individuals who can vouch for the authenticity of a recruit (Noonan, 
69). This is said to be because of its emphasis on the value of its individual fighters as opposed to a 
wide recruiting campaign (Greenwood, 89). The other extreme approach is characterized by ISIS’ 
practice, which is to accept any member of the ummah with welcome arms, after a background 
check. This approach is likely motivated by its claim to be an Islamic State, which means that per 
its own doctrine, ISIS is required to accept all of the ummah. It is also possible that this was a 
conscious decision in order to attract as many foreigners as possible in order to utilize their 
numbers or skills. 
Little is publically known about the recruiting techniques and requirements of most firms, 
as groups are likely to try to hide this information in order to limit state security forces from 
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interfering or disrupting the flow of foreigners. However, ISIS’ approach drastically lowers the cost 
of entry for aspiring foreign fighters, especially compared to the recruiting protocols of al Nusra. 
Because of its clandestine nature, entry into the jihadist movement is a difficult task, especially for 
individuals with no previous connection to the jihadist movement. Having a high bar to meet for 
potential recruits will undoubtedly limit the number of foreign recruits. This harkens back to the 
theory that the success of a foreign recruitment campaign is closely tied to the ease of the 
campaign, but in this example, the ease of entry instead of the ease of spreading recruitment 
messages. 
ISIS and al Qaeda are today’s leading jihadist groups, but they are not the only ones who 
compete within the movement. While it would be beyond the scope of this paper to analyze the 
many second tier jihadist firms, it is valuable to mention at least one other big name to note its 
failures to rise within the movement in juxtaposition to the success of ISIS or al Qaeda. Al Shabab 
was founded in 2006, entered the al Qaeda franchise network in 2012 and has remained loyal since, 
even in the face of recent internal power struggles with pro-ISIS members (Lister 2016C, 9). Al 
Shabab originally mixed nationalist rhetoric with its jihadist ideas, which limited its ability to 
effective tap into the global jihadist movement’s pool of recruits. This was especially so during its 
early efforts fighting the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia in 2006 when it presented itself as 
defenders of Somalia more than defenders of the ummah (Joosse, Bucerius, and Thompson, 820). It 
recruited foreign fighters but aimed its recruiting efforts mostly towards the Somali diaspora 
because of ethnic ties that allowed for very precise messaging at an audience that it knew how to 
connect with, in terms of what messages to use and what language to say them in. Most of its 
foreigners were thus ethnic Somalis, either from the diaspora or born in neighboring countries, and 
its true foreigners with no direct links were a small but valuable part of the organization (Joosse, 
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Bucerius, and Thompson, 818). Eventually, it tried to move away from nationalism and further 
towards jihadism, possible a conscious decision that the support the global jihadist movement 
could provide is better than the support coming in from the Somali diaspora. This has led to a 
successful widening of recruiting efforts geared towards foreigners, including more reliance on 
social media in a way similar to ISIS, though it still uses nationalist rhetoric when aiming recruiting 
messages at Somalis (Keatinge, 10). Another important difference is that its leadership is 
intentionally divided, as it utilizes a cell-based structure (Ligon et al., 29). While this gives its 
central leadership less power and authority to steer the organization, it also allows for greater 
security which is important as it does not have a solid hold on territory compared to ISIS or al 
Qaeda. It also has not been able to act globally, as its attacks outside of its immediate theater were 
still in neighboring countries involved in the war efforts against it. This shows it to be stuck with its 
local goals, which limits its ability to push its brand on the international jihadist movement 
compared to other groups, and explains why it failed to grow even with today’s massive uptick in 
the jihadist movement. 
 
CHAPTER 5: Conclusion 
 
The global jihadist movement is a complex and intricate one that claims roots tracing back 
to the first days of Islam. With an ideology that has persisted and evolved over many years, the 
movement has convinced tens of thousands of its righteousness and persisted even in the face of 
against a global effort to eradicate it. Its supporters include many Muslims who grew up in the 
West, even though it treats the West as a key target. These individuals form the base of the 
movement and are one of its most vital resources, as the movement needs to be able to replenish its 
63  
human losses and the foreigners add many skills to the toolsets of jihadist groups. 
The marketplace analogy is a useful one, because it treats those individuals for what they 
are within the movement, a resource necessary for its survival. In order to cripple the movement, it 
is important to limit its ability to reach and influence Muslims around the world. This will be very 
complex as jihadism paints a picture of a vulnerable ummah taken advantage of by hostile powers 
bent on destroying it, and it doesn’t help that the West’s primary response to jihadism has been 
primarily with tanks, soldiers, and unmanned drones. In order to fight jihadism, it is important to 
also focus efforts on depleting the movement of all of its resources, be it foreign fighters or state 
sponsors. It is also important to build up fragile societies into prosperous ones to present an 
alternative to jihadism, as conflicts and unstable states are where violent ideologies can thrive. This 
can be done alongside a military response, but one that is precise and does not cause further 
grievances to the local population that extremists can exploit. 
If today’s lessons are any indication of what is to come, there are some important issues that 
counterterrorism policy must to consider regarding future efforts against global jihad. One 
important note is that the efforts to degrade al Qaeda following September 11th and al 
Qaeda’s resulting decline within the jihadist movement played a key role in creating space for ISIS 
to grow (Novenario, 963). One prime example of this is the killing of Osama Bin Laden, a widely 
respected jihadist leader, which weakened al Qaeda’s sway over the greater movement and allowed 
for a radical usurper to vie with his successor for his legacy as this leadership vacuum allowed for 
other voices to be heard within the movement. This does not mean that attempting to take down 
violent organizations will always open the door for other extremists to compete in their relevant 
marketplace, but that counter terrorism efforts should be aware of all the possible side effects of 
their actions. However, this approach presents hope, as one of the strengths of an extremist 
ideology is that it presents the world as black and white, with an in and out group, which makes the 
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narratives that it tries to sell easier to transmit. When the ideology becomes fractured and its 
leaders argue amongst one another, it loses its ability to maintain the simple narrative of good and 
evil that it promotes, which may result in it losing some of its appeal. This may not always be the 
case because today’s infighting was also connected with an increase in jihadist activity. 
Nevertheless, if nothing else this infighting also wastes the movements resources, which can 
significantly weaken all groups involved, which can make global counterterrorism efforts a much 
simpler task. 
This fracturing also means more groups competing within the movement, so the 
result might be destructive if ISIS and al Qaeda, or even new firms, escalate their attempts to 
violently outbid one another in an effort to move up in the movement. This is especially so now 
that ISIS, the loudest jihadist group of fourth wave, is facing military defeat and another leadership 
vacuum is imminent. Given the durability of global jihadism, there will certainly be another wave 
of momentum for the movement. One danger is that the next wave of jihadist foreign fighters, 
when it inevitably arrives, will have learned from the mistakes and successes of this one. This is 
especially so since each wave of jihadist conflict utilized the foreign fighters of the previous wave, 
which means that today’s many veterans will have experience to make them better fighters and 
knowledge that can be used to make the next group they join more capable. 
Each wave was more radical than its predecessor, as the newly recruited foreigners were 
more idealistic and radical compared to those before them. It is hard to imagine a more radical 
jihadist group than ISIS, but the fact that their messages and techniques were so 
successful today means that their tactics are not going to be left behind. Groups with transnational 
goals now have a new standard to live up to, ranging from their media strategies, their governing 
structures, or their approach to the far enemy. But it is also possible that the next wave will be led 
by what remains of the movement’s current leadership. 
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Al Qaeda will of course survive the competition between it and ISIS because it has been 
proven right; it was not time for the return of the caliphate. While its legitimacy has taken a blow 
with the many attacks that ISIS dealt to its reputation, the fact that ISIS has lost its former glory 
might mean that those attacks now hold less weight within the movement. It may thus be in a 
position to grow from this wave, if it can find a way to consolidate its power within the remains of 
the movement that ISIS rejuvenated.  
ISIS on the other hand faces an existential threat. While it has global networks and 
resources that it can use to continue functioning as a firm, it must also find a way to justify its loss 
in Syria and Iraq. After all, a caliphate that falls within years can hardly be deemed a success, even 
if it was the first caliphate in nearly a century. It can blame the crusader coalition for this loss, but 
this is exactly what al Qaeda warned about, and so this defense is unlikely to help it maintain 
legitimacy. Its remaining members are likely to shift tactics, such as calling on foreigners to 
commit domestic attacks as opposed to foreign fighting, much like al Qaeda did when it was put on 
the defensive by global counterterrorism efforts. One key difference between al Qaeda during that 
era and ISIS now is ISIS’ returnee fighters whose official numbers remain a big unknown. It can be 
expected that they will be used for terrorist attacks in the future to continue ISIS’ legitimacy, if 
they are still loyal to their chain of command.  
What direction global jihadism will go is still highly uncertain, as it has proven to be a 
highly resilient movement. What is certain however is that the movement has its weak points, and 
the competition between ISIS and al Qaeda has given outsiders insight into exactly what some of 
those weak points are, which can be used in tomorrow’s counter terrorism efforts. Having multiple 
macro-cases of foreign fighting also presents the option to compare and contrast recruitment 
campaigns to see what works for jihadist recruitment and what does not to limit their future 
successes. One common theme throughout this paper is the success the jihadist movement and its 
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attempted movement building is tied to how easily it can spread its messages. This can take 
multiple forms as the ease of sending those messages can be changed through many factors 
unrelated to the movement itself or creative tactics used by groups for this purpose. Early on in the 
movement there was no serious effort to limit recruiting by governments unaware of what they 
were allowing to grow, while today’s social media atmosphere allowed for global gaps to be 
bridged in ways never before seen. For this reason, efforts to counter the movement shouldn’t be 
entirely focused on militarily defeating the groups that are able to grow, but in starving the 
movement of its facilitating resources and countering the messages that have convinced many to 
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